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T he enactment of Ohio's close corporation law in 1981 accomplished
one of the most sweeping changes in the history of this state's
corporation laws.' It introduced a new set of optional rules specially
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designed for the close corporation and its shareholders, thus satisfying a
pressing need that has been widely recognized for decades. The result is
that for most Ohio corporations, the opportunity now exists for the
arrangement of internal affairs in a simple and straightforward manner
as in the case of a partnership. 2
If this is so, it would hardly seem necessary to beat the drums to
encourage Ohio's lawyers to use the new law. Yet the reverse is true. The
close corporation law does not have automatic application 3 and does not
replace any part of the preexisting law. To take advantage of it,
affirmative steps must be taken beyond those to which lawyers organiz-
ing corporations are accustomed. For these reasons and because force of
habit and resistance to change have to be overcome, a broad awareness of
the opportunities now available under the close corporation law must be
created.
The new law will have the major impact it deserves only as the result
of initiative taken by Ohio attorneys engaged in the formation and
ongoing representation of close corporations. It is hoped that this article
will help motivate Ohio lawyers to provide that indispensable initiative.
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 1701.591 of the Ohio Revised Code 4 is Ohio's close corporation
law. It provides, through the use of a "close corporation agreement,"5 the
463 (1955). In light of the radical departure from traditional corporation law brought about
by the close corporation law, it might well be said that it not only overshadows the 1955
changes, but even those resulting from the adoption of the 1955 Act's predecessor in 1927
and, perhaps, all changes since 1903, when limited liability first became an incident of
incorporation. See Davies, Reflections of the Amateur Draftsmen of the Ohio General
Corporation Act, 12 Wis. L. REV. 487 (1936-1937). (It is interesting that the author stressed
the great flexibility of the 1927 General Corporation Act in regard to the close corporation.
Id. at 488-89).
2 For the single shareholder corporation, the new law provides the opportunity for the
procedural simplification of internal affairs to make them comparable to those of a sole
proprietorship. See Appendix B for a form of single shareholder close corporation agreement.
3 In more technical terms, the law is "enabling," not "self-executing," legislation. See
infra note 45.
' Oo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.591 (Anderson 1985), hereinafter referred to as "591." All
further references to various sections of the Ohio Revised Code will be to "O.R.C." followed
by the appropriate section number.
5 "Close corporation agreement" is defined in O.R.C. § 1701.01(X) by a cross-reference
to the three requirements set forth in 591(A). The close corporation legislation of other
states refers to a contract of this type by the generic term "shareholders agreement." See,
e.g., CALIF. CoRP. CODE §§ 186, 300(b)(West Supp. 1980); TEx. Bus. CoiP. AcT. ANN. art.
1201-12.32 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1984). Ohio's terminology is superior, because it
introduces a new statutory term of art which cannot be confused with the broader category
of agreements dealing with voting or other arrangements among shareholders, which are
governed by common law. See infra text under headings "Explanation of 591 - Other
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol35/iss1/9
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mechanism, first, for implementing unprecedented informality in the
functioning of a close corporation and, second, for establishing a legal
relationship among the shareholders that is essentially the same as that
provided by law for members of a partnership.
The emphasis of this paper will be its treatment of 591. However, a
broader focus will be the legal status of the Ohio close corporation, in
terms of where it has been, where it is now, and where it should be going.
Dealing more specifically with what follows, the article will treat 591
in depth, including its text and background. 6 To provide perspective, the
development of close corporation legislation generally and in other
jurisdictions will be briefly discussed. 7 To fill out the contours of the Ohio
law, the article will summarize other provisions of the Ohio General
Corporation Law (referred to below as "OGCL") having a special effect on
the close corporation.8 Finally, the writer will consider and recommend
improvements to Ohio's laws pertaining to close corporations, 9 consisting
principally of legislation to provide self-executing relief from shareholder
oppression.
II. OVERVIEW OF CLOSE CORPORATION LEGISLATION' 0
Close corporations comprise the vast majority of all incorporated
businesses in this country1 ' and, thus, the legal issues concerning them
are among the most numerous and important confronting lawyers
engaged in the business-corporate or general practice.
Although there are a number of published definitions of the close
corporation, 12 all the definitions stress certain general characteristics,
Shareholder Agreements" and "Explanation of 591 -Savings Clause." See also infra notes
133 and 156.
' See infra text under headings "'Legislative History' of 591," "Objective, Philosophy,
and Approach of 591," and "Explanation of 591."
7 See infra text under heading "Overview of Close Corporation Legislation."
s See infra text under heading "Other OGCL Provisions Affecting Close Corporations."
9 See infra text under heading 'The Need for Additional Legislation."
10 The special status of the close corporation and its legislative treatment have been the
subject of a great amount of legal literature. The preeminent treatise in the field is
Professor O'Neal's two-volume work, first published in 1958. F. O'NEAL, CLOSE
CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1971). An article by Professor O'Neal appears elsewhere in this
symposium issue of the Law Review. Many other articles on the subject are cited
throughout these notes.
1' H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 257, at 695 (3d ed. 1983).
12 "Closely held corporation" is a term used interchangeably with "close corporation".
The former may technically be the sounder generic term to cover both corporations that
have statutory close corporation status and those that have not. H. HENN & S. ALEXANDER,
supra note 11, at 695 n.3. The term "close corporation," however, will be used uniformly
throughout this article to refer to all corporations falling within the definition,
irrespective of special statutory status. Corporations whose shares of stock are traded in the
1987]
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1987
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
namely, a small number of shareholders and the absence of any estab-
lished market for their shares; the active participation by all or most of
the shareholders in the business, usually serving as the directors, officers
and managerial employees; and the intangible, yet critical, factor of
having a closer functional relationship to the partnership form than to
the corporate form. 13
The necessity for special rules of law to accommodate the distinctive
needs of the close corporation is well established. 14 In the absence of
special laws, the shareholders of a close corporation, who think of
themselves as partners, nevertheless find themselves forced into the mold
provided by the traditional general corporation law, which also governs
the corporate giants listed on major stock exchanges.15 The basic premise
of these general laws is the existence of the corporation as a legal entity
separate and distinct from its shareholders,' 6 a philosophy that is
inherently incompatible with the co-ownership premise of the partner-
ship entity.17 Thus, it is not surprising that fundamental rules governing
the conduct of corporate affairs, which may be beneficial in their
application to publicly traded corporations,18 can cause severe problems
and unfair results when applied to the close corporation. Chief among
such rules are the principle of majority control' 9 and the business
securities market will be referred to throughout this article as "publicly traded
corporations."
13 See Estate of Schroer v. Stamco Supply, Inc., 19 Ohio App. 3d 34, 482 N.E.2d 975
(1984); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975); Kruger v.
Gerth, 16 N.Y.2d 802, 210 N.E.2d 355 (1965); F. O'NEAL, supra note 10, at § 1.02; L.
SOLOMON, CORPORATIONS, LAW AND POuLCIES, at 305 (1982).
'4 See, e.g., F. O'NEAL, supra note 10, § 1.13a at 51; Ginsberg, The Need for Special Close
Corporation Legislation in Illinois, 25 DE PAUL L. REV. 1, 4 n.21 (1975); Note, The Failure of
the Ohio General Corporation Law to Adequately Provide for Close Corporations - Proposals
for Change, 37 U. CiN. L. REV. 620 (1968). Over twenty years ago Professor Bradley stated
that the inappropriateness of the general corporation laws for close corporations "has been
observed ad nauseum." Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation The Need for
More and Improved Legislation, 54 GEo. L.J. 1145 (1966).
15 See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 11, at 698; SOLOMON, supra note 13, at 302.
'G See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 11, § 78, at 146; W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 14, 25 (rev. perm. ed. 1983)(corporate entity is presumed
to be separate and distinct whether the corporation has many shareholders or only one);
Dickinson, Partners in a Corporate Cloak: The Emergence and Legitimacy of the Incorpo-
rated Partnership, 33 AM. UL. REV. 559, 563 (1984).
17 See UNIFoRM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6 (1910); J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP
§ 14, at 65 (1968).
" See Mann, A Critical Analysis of the Statutory Close Corporation Supplement to the
Model Business Corporation Act, 22 AM. Bus. L.J. 289, 309 (1984); Coffey, Book Review, 23
CASE W. RES. 976, 984 (1972)(reviewing F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATION, LAW AND PRACTICE (2d
ed. 1971)).
' "[T]he holders of a majority of the shares with voting power control the corporation."
F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 1.02 (2d ed.
1985).
[Vol. 35:165
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judgment rule.20 The effect of these companion principles, when applied
to the close corporation, is to deprive minority shareholders of a voice in
20 If in the course of management, directors arrive at a decision, within the
corporation's powers (intra vires) and their authority, for which there is a
reasonable basis, and they act in good faith, as the result of their independent
discretion and judgment, and uninfluenced by any consideration other than what
they honestly believed to be the best interests of the corporation, a court will not
interfere with internal management and substitute its judgment for that of the
directors to enjoin or set aside the transaction or to surcharge the directors for any
resulting loss.
H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 11, § 242, at 661.
The general effect of the rule is to discourage interference by courts with decisions made
by the corporation's directors and officers. See Peeples, The Use and Misuse of the Business
Judgment Rule in the Close Corporation, 60 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 456, 459 (1985).
Ohio's codified version of the rule as amended, effective November 22, 1986, appears in
O.R.C. § 1701.59, as follows:
(B) A director shall perform his duties as a director.., in good faith, in a manner
he reasonably believes to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would use under similar circumstances ....
(C) For purposes of division (B) of this section:
(1) A Director shall not be found to have violated his duties under division (B)
of this section unless it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that the
director has not acted in good faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be in
or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, or with the care that an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circum-
stances in any action brought against a director, including actions involving or
affecting any of the following:
(a) a change or potential change in control of the corporation;
(b) a termination or potential termination of his service to the corporation as
a director;
(c) his service in any other position or relationship with the corporation ....
(D) A director shall be liable in damages for any action he takes or fails to take as
a director only if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence in a court of
competent jurisdiction that his action or failure to act involved an act or omission
undertaken with deliberate intent to cause injury to the corporation or under-
taken with reckless disregard for the best interests of the corporation ....
The purpose of the 1986 amendments was to provide greatly increased protection for
directors who resist unfriendly takeovers. While the amendments were being deliberated,
concern was voiced by some that these changes might unintentionally facilitate oppression
of minority shareholders of a close corporation by the majority in violation of the latter's
fiduciary duty. See infra, text under heading The Need for Additional Legislation - Relief
from Shareholder Oppression. To allay the fears expressed on behalf of minority sharehold-
ers, there was added to O.R.C. § 1701.59 the following: "(F) Nothing contained in division
(C) or (D) of this section affects the duties of either of the following: (1) A director who acts
in any capacity other than his capacity as a director .... "
In Gries Sports Enter. v. Cleveland Football Co., 25 Ohio St. 2d 15, 496 N.E.2d 959 (1986),
the Ohio Supreme Court, although sharply divided (four to three) as to the result,
nevertheless, in a total of five separate opinions, unanimously assumed that, under
Delaware law, the business judgment rule applied to a close corporation. The justices
differed, however, as to whether a majority of the directors were disinterested and
independent so as to be eligible to claim the benefit of the rule.
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the corporation's affairs and to facilitate oppressive action against them
on the part of the controlling shareholders. 2'
Early attempts by close corporation shareholders to escape the ill-
fitting cloak of the general corporation law were rebuffed by courts. Their
thesis was that, having chosen the corporate form, the shareholders were
bound by its attributes and could not by agreement vary the corporate
norms and thereby conduct their internal affairs as if they were part-
ners.22 Thus, for example, in an oft-cited case,2 an agreement among
shareholders designating one of their number as an officer of the
corporation at a stipulated salary was struck down as being an imper-
missible impingement on the statutory corporate norm conferring exclu-
sive authority on the directors to take such action.24
Following World War II and accelerating since 1960, state legislatures
have passed laws to accommodate the special needs of close corpora-
tions.25 At the present time such legislation, in one form or another, has
been adopted in twenty-one states,26 including most of the leading
commercial and industrial states.
21 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at § 1.02, § 3.03.
22 The classic citation for this proposition is Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 A.
568 (N.J. 1909).
23 McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934), in which the agreement in
question was among less than all the shareholders. A similar result in a case where all the
shareholders were party to the agreement was reached in Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New
Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 633 (1948).
24 To dispel the notion that the rules established by these older cases lack vitality today
when applied to corporations not enjoying statutory close corporation status, see the dissent
in Zion v. Kurtz, 50 N.Y.2d 92, 99, 405 N.E.2d 681, 688 (1980). It is there stated that "the
common law rule applicable to both closely and publicly held corporations continues to treat
agreements to deprive the board of directors of substantial authority as contrary to public
policy," and that deviations from the corporate norm pose a danger to the public as potential
purchasers of the stock. The majority opinion, in upholding the agreement, relied on
sections 350 and 354 of the close corporation subchapter of the General Corporation Law of
Delaware, which validate an agreement among the shareholders of a statutory close
corporation otherwise invalid as an impermissible departure from the corporation norms.
For a contrary view, see Easterbrook and Fischel, Close Corporation and Agency Costs, 38
STAN. L. REV. 271, 281 (1986)("McQuade is a fossil. Today courts enforce voluntary
agreements of all sorts among investors in close corporations.").
" O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 Bus.
LAW. 873 (1978).
26 Alabama, ALA. CODE §§ 10-2A-300 to 10-2A-313 (1975); Arizona, ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 10-201 to 10-218 (1977); California, CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 158, 186, 202, 204, 300, 418, 421,
706, 1111, 1201, 1800, 1904 (West Supp. 1980); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 341-356
(1983); Florida, FLA. STAT. § 607.107(2)(1962); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-120(b)(1982);
Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, 1201-1216 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN.
§8 17-7201 to 7216 (1981); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A §§ 102.5, 604, 606, 607, 618,
701.2 (1973); Maryland, MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 4-101 to 603; Michigan, MICH.
Come. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.1103(c), 450.1463 (West 1973 J. Supp. 1980); Minnesota, MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.201, Subd. 2, 302A.457 (West 1985); New Jersey, N.J. REV, STAT.
[Vol. 35:165
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In 1982, after five years of consideration, the Committee on Corporate
Laws of the American Bar Association's Section of Corporation, Banking
and Business Law adopted the model "Statutory Close Corporation Sup-
plement to the Model Business Corporation Act (hereinafter "MODEL ACT
SUPPLEMENT"). 2 7 Recognition of the need for special close corporation leg-
islation perhaps reached its zenith by the action of this prestigious group,
which modified its earlier stated position that the requirements of close
corporations could be adequately met within the provision of the Model
Business Corporation Act generally applicable to all corporations.
28
A survey of existing close corporation legislation, including the Model
Act Supplement, yields the following inclusive list of the basic objectives
of such laws: (1) sanctioning informality in the corporation's internal
operations, such as elimination of the board of directors;29 (2) validating
an agreement among shareholders covering management and control of
the corporation, including protection of the rights of individual share-
holders in such areas as employment and sharing profits; 30 (3) validating
or mandating restrictions on the transfer of shares of the corporation's
stock;31 and (4) providing remedies for internal strife, 32 such as dissen-
sion and deadlock and shareholder oppression.33
§ 14A.1-1(3)(C), 14A.5-21(2)(6)(West & 1969 Supp. 1985); New York, N.Y. Bus. CORP. Law
§ 620(b)(McKinney Supp. 1980); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b)(1962); Ohio,
Otno REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.591 (Anderson 1985); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§§ 1371-1381 (Purdon 1985); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-51 (1969); South Carolina,
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-11-220 (Law Co. Op. Supp. 1984); Texas, TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. art.
1201-12.54 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1984); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 180.995(1)-(21)(West
Supp. 1985). It is difficult to arrive at an exact count because of the great variety of statutes
adopted by states dealing in varying degrees with close corporations. The criterion for
selecting the laws appearing in the foregoing list is that each contains provisions
specifically permitting deviations from the corporate norms and permitting partnershiplike
planning among shareholders. Thus, these laws are comparable in their objective to 591.
27 See Statutory Close Corp. Supp. to the Mod. Bus. Corp. Act., 38 Bus. LAW. 1031 (1982).
See also, Proposed Statutory Close Corp. Supp. to the Model Bus. Corp. Act, 37 Bus. LAW. 269
(1981). The reporter and principal draftsman of the MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT was Professor
Harry J. Haynsworth, whose article appears elsewhere in this symposium issue of the Law
Review.
28 See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 35, at 756 (1977) (special comment - close
corporations); Elfin, A Critique of the Proposed Statutory Close Corporation Supplement to
the Model Business Corporation Act, 8 J. CoRe. LAW 439, 441 (1983).
29 See, e.g., MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT § 21; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 351 (1983).
30 See e.g., MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT § 20; ILL. ANN. STAT. § 1211. Shareholder protection
provisions of this type will generally be hereinafter referred to as "management and
control" provisions.
21 See, e.g., MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT §§ 11-17; DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 202 (1983); N.J. REV.
STAT. § 14A:7-12 (West 1969 & Supp. 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 372 (Purdon 1985).
32 See, e.g., MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT § 40; N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A: 7-12 (West 1969 & Supp.
1985).
3 Conceptually, there is an important difference between the thrust of the first three
1987]
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One characteristic is shared by all the existing legislation. None of
these laws is a self-contained law governing the close corporation
exclusively and thereby fully displacing the general corporation law. 34 In
other respects, however, the various close corporation statutory provi-
sions differ greatly in form and in substance. Some are contained in a
separate subchapter or supplement to the general corporation law, which
deals with the subject matter in one place and in a comprehensive
manner. 35 Others are scattered throughout the state's general corpora-
tion law.3 6 The various laws are also quite different concerning the
number of the four listed objectives covered, the comprehensiveness of
their treatment of the subject matter, and the formalities required of the
electing corporation.
The pioneering law, adopted by North Carolina in 1955, 37 had a major
impact on the drafters of 591. So abbreviated and informal as almost to be
overlooked among its counterparts in other states, it nevertheless em-
bodies an approach that Ohio's drafters found appealing. 38
The Model Act Supplement, while taking the integrated subchapter
approach of Delaware and other states, is considerably more comprehen-
sive and innovative than any of the close corporation statutes that
preceded it. Within its twenty-two sections, it covers in depth all four
objectives of close corporation legislation. The Model Act Supplement can
be expected to have considerable impact on the continuing enactment of
special close corporation legislation, especially in those states that have
taken no such action prior to its adoption. 39
objectives and that of the fourth. The first three objectives are all directed to encouraging
advance planning on the part of the shareholders in order to simplify corporate governance
and to avoid later friction among shareholders. The fourth objective is directed toward
alleviating a breakdown in the shareholder relationship in the absence of effective advance
planning. See infra text accompanying notes 191 - 95.
3 D. VAGTS, BASIc CORPORATION LAW 779 (2d ed. 1979).
3 These are generally referred to as the "integrated" close corporation laws. Examples
include subchapter XIV of Delaware's corporation statute, one of the earliest integrated
statutes, and the MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT, which is the most recent prototype. Although far
different than the other statutes in this category, 591 is also an integrated law, since it
contains all of the special provisions dealing with close corporations. See MODEL ACT
SUPPLEMENT at 1868 (comment to § 55).
36 See, e.g., CALIF. CORP. CODE § 158 (West 1980 Supp.); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.201,
.455, .457, .751 (West 1980).
3 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b)(1982).
3 See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
3 See Kessler, The ABA Close Corporation Statute, 36 MERCER L. REV. 661, 662 (1985);
Solomon, supra note 13, at 304. In 1984, Wisconsin became the first (and thus far, the only)
state to adopt, largely intact, the MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 180.995 (West
Supp. 1985).
[Vol. 35:165
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III. OTHER OGCL PROVISIONS AFFECTING CLOSE CORPORATIONS
A number of other sections of the OGCL, which antedated 591, are of
special significance to the close corporation. Most of these provisions,
interspersed throughout the OGCL and applicable to all Ohio corpora-
tions, were no doubt designed for close corporation use.40 Although 591
has become the key provision of Ohio law dealing with close corporations,
these other sections and their continuing role must be part of a complete
assessment of the position of the close corporation under Ohio law.
The effect of these sections can best be appreciated by examining them
in terms of whether their impact on the close corporation lies in the area
of procedure or substance. First then, in the category of simplifying
corporate procedures, are provisions permitting: the use of only one
person as incorporator;4 1 reductions of the standard minimum of three
directors to one director if there is only one shareholder, or to two
directors if there are only two shareholders; 42 action by either sharehold-
ers or directors by unanimous written consent in lieu of a meeting;43 and
telephonic meetings of directors. 44
Next, in the category of substance, it is helpful to subdivide the
provisions into self-executing and enabling types. 45 The self-executing
items consist of provisions mandating: pre-emptive rights for sharehold-
ers;46 cumulative voting for the election and against removal of direc-
tors;47 a shareholder's right of inspection of corporate records for reason-
40 See O'Neal, supra note 25, at 878-79.
41 O.R.C. § 1701.04.
42 O.R.C. § 1701.56. Illinois' new Business Corporation Act allows the board of directors
to consist of one or more members, regardless of the number of shareholders. ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 32, (P) 8.10 (Smith-Hurd 1985).
3 O.R.C. § 1701.54. Since 1981, Minnesota law has permitted the articles of incorpora-
tion to authorize the taking of action by a writing signed by only the number of directors
required to take the same action at a meeting, provided that all directors are notified
immediately following. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.239 (West 1985).
44 O.R.C. § 1701.61(B).
4' The distinction between "self-executing" and "enabling" legislation appears repeat-
edly throughout this article and is critical to an understanding of a number of positions
taken. Self-executing legislation imposes rules of conduct that are automatically effective
with regard to a corporation without the necessity of any action on the part of the
corporation or its shareholders. Enabling (or "permissive") legislation, on the other hand,
merely provides the opportunity for the corporation and its shareholders to take action to
adopt rules of conduct. See WEBSTER's NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 596, 1646 (2d
ed. 1983); Kessler, supra note 39, at 697.
46 O.R.C. § 1701.15. This section permits the total elimination of pre-emptive rights by
a provision in the articles of incorporation. In addition, it contains a number of exceptions,
including one for treasury shares. Compare O.R.C. § 1701.591(C)(10); see infra text
accompanying note 129.
47 O.R.C. § 1701.55. Ohio Senate Bill No. 259, 116th Gen. Assembly, Gen. Sess. 1986,
Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-278 (Baldwin), which became effective July 24, 1986, amended O.R.C.
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able and proper purposes;48 a shareholder's right to an annual financial
statement;49 the holding of an annual meeting of shareholders;5 0 and
dissenters' rights of appraisal upon the occurrence of fundamental
changes involving the corporation or its business.51
The items authorized by enabling provisions consist of:52 voting trusts
and irrevocable proxies; 53 classification of shares and voting by classes; s4
classification of directors;55 high percentage quorum and voting require-
§ 1701.55 and other sections of the OGCL to permit the elimination of cumulative voting
rights by (and only by) the adoption of an amendment to the articles of incorporation. The
new amendment provisions do, however, incorporate safeguards applicable to close corpo-
rations. They provide that, unless the corporation's shares are publicly traded, adoption of
the necessary amendment can be defeated by the votes of a number of shares that if voted
cumulatively, would be sufficient to elect at least one director. In addition, action to adopt
the amendment must be preceded by written notice to shareholders that conspicuously
warns of the adverse consequences of the amendment to minority shareholders. No
amendment can be adopted on behalf of a close corporation earlier than ninety days after
the formation of the corporation.
Earlier versions of the bill had exempted from the ninety day requirement a corporation
for which cumulative voting had been eliminated "pursuant to section 1701.591." Such
language, however, was dropped from the final form of the bill as being unnecessary, since
the elimination of cumulative voting rights is clearly permitted under a close corporation
agreement adopted pursuant to 591. See infra note 113. None of the formalities specified
under Senate Bill 259 is required for elimination of cumulative voting pursuant to a close
corporation agreement. Should the agreement be later terminated, however, cumulative
voting rights would be reinstated and could not be denied to a minority shareholder except
by the adoption of an amendment to the articles that complies with the requirements
imposed by Senate Bill 259.
At first blush, providing the ability to opt-out of cumulative voting might appear to be a
serious diminution of already sparse self-executing protection provided by Ohio law for
minority shareholders. See infra text accompanying note 209. On the other hand, the benefits
of being a minority director may, except for its watchdog function, be more apparent than
real. See supra note 14, 37 Cin. L. Rev. at 626-27. Certainly, whatever benefit a minority
shareholder might achieve through cumulative voting would be slight in comparison to the
more concrete protection of individual rights available to him under a specially tailored close
corporation agreement. In order to deprive the minority of cumulative voting rights, the
majority, whether it proceeds through the use of an amendment to the articles or a close
corporation agreement, will have to deal with the minority in order to achieve its purpose.
Thus, either event will present an opportunity for constructive discussion and bargaining
between the shareholder factions covering all aspects of their relationship.
48 O.R.C. § 1701.37(C). In contrast, 591(C)(9) affords an unrestricted right of inspection.
See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
49 O.R.C. § 1701.38.
50 O.R.C. § 1701.39. See infra notes 172-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of a
recommended amendment to permit the relaxation of this requirement.
61 O.R.C. § 1701.85.
12 The OGCL sections listed in notes 54-58 require that the special requirement be
contained in the articles of incorporation.
53 O.R.C. §§ 1701.49, 1701.48.
54 O.R.C. §§ 1701.04, 1701.06.
55 O.R.C. § 1701.57.
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ments for shareholder and director meetings;56 voluntary dissolution by
a vote of less than a majority;5 7 and appointment of a provisional director
where necessary to break a deadlock in the board of directors. 58
These provisions of the OGCL, like their counterparts in the corpora-
tion laws of other states, are highly inadequate to deal with the special
needs of the close corporation. Their main accomplishment is to loosen,
somewhat, the procedural straightjacket by permitting a degree of
informality in the conduct of internal affairs. In, however the vastly more
important substantive area of management and control, they meet the
close corporation's needs only to a severely limited extent, and even then
at a high and often prohibitive cost in terms of complicated drafting
requirements, substantial legal fees and uncertainty as to enforceabil-
ity.59 Still, their greatest shortcoming is the complete inability to make
available certain far more effective planning devices possible under
591.60
The final subject to be addressed in this segment is the remaining
significance of these other OGCL provisions, now that 591 is on the books.
The procedural and the self-executing substantive provisions, since they
have automatic application, continue to have vitality, especially where
no steps to engage in close corporation planning are taken by the
shareholders. However, the opposite is true of the enabling substantive
provisions, which, like 591, can be availed of only by the taking of
affirmative steps by the shareholders. It is chiefly here that, as pro-
claimed in the lyrics of that popular song from the hit Broadway musical
play of the 40's, 591's boast to the rest of the OGCL can legitimately be:
"Anything you can do, I can do better; I can do anything better than
you."61 Because the subject matter can now be treated so much more
effectively and economically by a close corporation agreement, it must be
recognized that these older planning provisions of the OGCL have been
rendered obsolete by 591.62
56 O.R.C. §§ 1701.51, 1701.52, 1701.62. Cf. 591(C)(3) ("voting requirements need not
appear in the articles unless the close corporation argument is set forth in the articles.")
57 O.R.C. § 1701.86(E). Cf. 591(C)(2)(close corporation agreement may provide for
dissolution by one or more shareholders).
58 O.R.C. § 1701.911. For a qualitative comparison of this remedy with the use of
arbitration, which may be availed of pursuant to a provision contained in a close corporation
agreement pursuant to 591(C)(11), see infra note 135.
59 Ginsberg, supra note 14, at 9. See infra notes 136, 137 and accompanying text. See
MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT at 1806 (introductory comment).
60 See infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
61 Berlin, "Anything You Can Do," from "Annie Get Your Gun" (1946).
62 The distinction that a close corporation agreement requires shareholder unanimity
and the other OGCL provisions discussed do not is unimportant. As a practical matter, the
subject of the planning action will be such that, regardless of the means used, it will be
necessary that all shareholders concur. This is so because the planning will almost always
1987]
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In every case, therefore, where clients are engaged in close corporation
planning, counsel should seriously consider the use of a close corporation
agreement as the means of accomplishing the clients' objectives. 63 More-
over, except where only the simplest type of planning is desired by the
clients, a close corporation agreement should be the vehicle. 64
IV. "LEGISLATIVE HISTORY'"65 OF 591
The Ohio General Assembly passed 591 on November 17, 1981, and it
became effective the same day.6 6 The law was amended in a number of
be directed to protective measures for minority shareholders or delineation of the rights of
two sole equal shareholders.
"I Throughout this article the emphasis is on the value of a close corporation agreement
as a comprehensive planning tool in the organizational stage of the corporation. It should
not be overlooked, however, that 591 can provide the means to structure a direct and
simplified solution to a special problem of narrow scope confronting the shareholders of an
existing corporation.
' Serious implications regarding legal ethics and malpractice may be present when an
attorney undertakes the organization of a close corporation having more than one share-
holder. Problems may arise where the attorney represents both majority and minority
shareholders or, perhaps, even where the formal representation is confined to a majority
shareholder, when the minority shareholder is not represented by other counsel. See O'Neal
and Thompson, supra note 19, at vii, § 9:02. The preparation of a close corporation
agreement under these circumstances raises questions relating to conflict of interest and
duties incumbent upon a lawyer acting as "intermediary." See J. Lewis and A. Cirulnick,
Stockholders' Agreements, 20 A.LI./A-BA. COURSE MATERIALS JOURNAL (No. 1) 49, 51-54
(1985); Weinberg, New Close Corporation Law: A Green Light and a Yellow Light for Ohio
Lawyers, 55 OHIO ST. B. ASs'N REP. 1068, 1068-70 (1982); Karjala, A Second Look at Special
Close Corporation Legislation, 58 TEx. L. REV. 1207, 1228 (1980). An effect of the greatly
facilitated planning option made possible by 591 may well be to intensify these problems.
ei The author has appropriated the phrase for the title of this section of the article, since
no meaningful legislative history is maintained by the Ohio General Assembly with respect
to its proceedings. The only official publications of the activities of the General Assembly
are the "Journals of the Senate and House of Representatives." The Journals, pursuant to
Article II, § 15(C) of the Ohio Constitution, record, in the nature of a docket, the earlier
readings and final vote on bills on the floor of the House of Representatives and Senate.
There is no record kept of testimony, statements, or debate, either in committee or on the
floor of either House.
e" Following final action on Amended Ohio House Bill No. 455, 114th Gen. Assembly
Gen. Sess. (1981), Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-593 (Baldwin), by the General Assembly, it was
signed the same evening by Governor James Rhodes. The Bill became effective immediately
by virtue of an emergency clause. The author would like to believe that the politicians were
in agreement with the academicians that the need for remedial close corporation legislation
was so great that emergency action was warranted. One need not be a cynic, however, to
suspect that such was not the case. Instead, the Corporation Law Committee's
uncontroversial (the bill passed the Ohio House by an 87-0 vote) child happened to have
toddled into the Senate at the opportune time for the politicians to make it the subject of a
logrolling type of exercise by adding to HB 455 urgent action to protect Marathon Oil Co.
against the pending takeover bid of Mobil Oil Co. The result was the addition to the original
close corporation law bill of a new unrelated section, O.R.C. § 1331.021, dealing with the
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respects, effective April 4, 1985.67 The amendments were chiefly of a
technical nature.68 There were several language clarifications, 69 and a
few minor substantive changes. 70
A retroactivity provision with respect to the 1985 amendments is
contained in division (N). Discussions among the Close Corporation
Subcommittee, counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee, and repre-
sentatives of the Ohio Legislative Service Commission took place regard-
ing retroactivity during the early stages of the legislation. All were in
agreement on the desirability of making the amendments retroactive, so
as to encompass all close corporation agreements entered into since the
original enactment of 591 in 1981.71 That is clearly the intent of division
(N), although there is technical inaccuracy in the language used, since
the reference is to "close corporations created on or after November 17,
1981" rather than, as it should have been, to "close corporation agree-
ments adopted" after that date.7 2
Since close corporation agreements are treated the same under 591
regardless of whether they were entered before or after the various
amendments, the discussion of the provisions of 591 below 73 will be
addressed to the law as amended to the date of this article, with no
distinction between the original and amended versions of the law.
evils of "reducing competition in the sale of petroleum products in Ohio" and including an
emergency clause providing for immediate implementation of the expanded act. See
Lorincz, U.S. Steel Finds Gusher in Ohio, N. OHIO Bus. J. 3 (Nov. 23, 1981).
" Amended substitute Ohio House Bill 607, l5th Gen. Assembly, Gen. Sess. (1984),
Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-895 (Baldwin) signed by Governor Richard Celeste on January 3, 1985.
When Chapter 1308 of the Ohio Revised Code was amended in 1983 for the purpose of
authorizing the issuance of shares in uncertificated form, division (M) was added to 591 to
bar the use of uncertificated securities by any corporation that is the subject of a close
corporation agreement. An inconsequential conforming amendment to division (C)(7) of 591
occurred also in 1984 when the language of O.R.C. § 1701.33 concerning the declaration of
dividends was expanded to include "distributions." See OHIO GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 63,94
(Judson-Brooks ed. 1986)("Committee Comment (1984)" to O.R.C. §§ 1701.33, 1701.591).
" See Report of the Corporation Law Committee, 57 OHio ST B. Ass'N REP. 498 (1984);
OHIO GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 94 (Judson-Brooks ed. 1985) "Committee Comment (1985)"
to 591.
6 The most important clarification is discussed in infra note 113.
70 See infra notes 104 and 106.
71 Correspondence and notes received and compiled by the author in his capacity as
Chairman of the Close Corporation Subcommittee of the Corporation Law Committee of the
Ohio State Bar Association.
72 The official heading of 591 is "Close Corporation Agreements" and the entire
emphasis of the section is on the agreement. Thus, there is no such thing as a statutory
"close corporation" in Ohio; there is only a statutory "close corporation agreement."
" See infra text under the heading "Explanation of 591."
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V. OBJECTIVE, PHILOSOPHY, AND APPROACH OF 591
The objective of 591 is to provide the means for shareholders of Ohio
close corporations to take foolproof action to (1) free themselves and the
corporation of standard corporate formalities, and (2) engage in advance
planning for the purpose of arranging their relationship inter se as if they
were members of a partnership.74 The philosophy underlying 591 is the
accomplishment of its objective in the simplest manner possible.75 The
law's approach is the use, as in the case of a partnership, of a straight-
forward agreement as the sole vehicle to achieve the objective.76
The drafters of 591 were aware that, compared to the broadest possible
scope of special close corporation legislation,77 theirs was a narrow
objective. Their assignment78 was limited to insuring freedom of contract
to shareholders seeking informality and the arrangement of their inter-
nal affairs in partnershiplike fashion. 79 An important related objective,
however, was to formulate a law that, by its nature, would encourage its
widespread use by lawyers engaged in the general practice, as well as by
corporation specialists.
The drafters believed that, consistent with their objectives of making it
possible to simplify the corporate form, the means of accomplishing their
objective should likewise be as uncomplicated and direct as possible.80
They were convinced that the comparable laws of most other states were
needlessly complex and that, mainly for that reason, they were not
meeting with wide acceptance. 8' Yet, at the other extreme, the highly
" See Report of the Corporation Law Committee, 53 Oio ST. B. ASS'N REP. 510, 516
(1980).
75 Id. at 510.
76 Id. at 516.
71 See supra text and accompanying notes 29-33.
78 For information concerning the deliberations of the committees responsible for the
drafting of 591, see infra note 163.
71 Validation of the agreement establishing the relationship among shareholders is the
heart of special close corporation legislation. See Johnson, The Texas Close Corporation
Law: Some Observations and Modest Proposals, 15 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 779, 794 (1984);
Kessler, supra note 39, at 676. As the preventative aspect of such legislation, it serves a
purpose that is independent of the remaining major aspect, which is a self-executing
provision embodying remedies for shareholder oppression. See infra text under heading
"Need for Additional Legislation - Relief of Shareholder Oppression."
so See Mann, supra note 18, at 292, 341. It might be noted that the creation of simplified
legislation is a goal worthy of guiding the efforts of draftsmen in all areas of the law. See
Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practices and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570, 583 (1983).
S1 See Committee On Corporate Laws, Proposed Statutory Close Corp. Supplement To
The Model Business Corp. Act, 37 Bus. LAw 269, 272 (1981); Kessler, supra note 39, at 670;
Hetherington & Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitations: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the
Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REv. 1, 60-61 (1977). This has been
recognized as a major reason for the repeal of the initial close corporation law adopted by the
State of Texas, TEx. Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN. art. 2.30-1 to -5 (Vernon 1980) and enactment of
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abbreviated and negative approach of the North Carolina statute seemed
to be dangerously ill-equipped to accomplish the demanding task of
unequivocally bringing about such a radical change in the established
law.52 Consequently, the decision was made that Ohio's statute should
take a different tack.
The approach of 591 is to require, in order to enjoy the advantages
provided by the law, only the single step of signing a qualified close
corporation agreement. Nevertheless, in sharp contrast to the few states
employing the same simple technique,8 3 591 provides strong assurance of
the durability of the agreement through detailed provisions pointedly
designed to overcome any claim of invalidity founded on inconsistent,
deep-rooted corporate doctrine.8 4
A key factor in 591's simplified approach is the absence of a require-
ment that an election of close corporation status appear in the articles of
incorporation.8 5 Likewise, no provision of the close corporation agree-
ment need be set forth or referenced in the articles; this is true no matter
how radical the departure from the corporate norm, such as, for example,
elimination of the board of directors. The role of the statute is likewise
limited. Its sole function is to legitimize the agreement, define the
boundaries of its permitted subject matter, and prescribe the require-
ments for its creation and continued effectiveness. 86 Beyond that, 591
its successor law, TEx. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 12.01.54 (Vernon 1981); Blunk, Analyzing
Texas Articles of Incorporation: Is the Statutory Close Corporation Format Viable? 34 Sw.
L.J. 941, 942 (1980); Johnson, supra note 79, at 780, 781.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b)(1982). This statute, consisting of little more than a dozen
lines, simply provides that no agreement among all shareholders relating to any phase of
the affairs of the corporation shall be invalid as between the parties on the ground that it
is an attempt to treat the corporation as if it were a partnership. Cf 591(F)(1)(parallel Ohio
close corporation provisions). Paragraph (c) of the same North Carolina statutory section
consumes only a few additional lines in stating that an agreement among all or less than all
shareholders is not invalid on the ground that it interferes with the discretion of the board
of directors. Cf 591(F)(3)(parallel Ohio close corporation provisions). For a discussion of the
uncertainty resulting from the negative phrasing of statutory close corporation provisions,
see Wang, The California Statutory Close Corporation: Gateway to Flexibility or Trap for the
Unwary?, 15 SAN DjEo L. REV. 687, 704-05 (1978)(concerning CALIF. CORP. CODs § 300(b)
which is modeled on the North Carolina statute).
83 FLA. STAT. § 607.107(2); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-120(b); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b) & (c).
The Florida and Georgia laws are in substance and length very similar to the North
Carolina statute.
4 See Bradley, A Comparative Evaluation of the Delaware and Maryland Close Corpo-
ration Statutes, 1968 DuKE L. J. 525, 527 (1968).
" 591(A)(2) does provides the option of placing the entire close corporation agreement
in the articles of incorporation or code of regulations rather than in a "written instrument."
As to the advisability of including the agreement in the articles or, instead, in a separate
writing, see infra note 126 and accompanying text. For a form of single shareholder close
corporation agreement contained in the articles, see Appendix B.
8r 591(A), (C), (I).
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itself adds nothing to the special features of the corporation or the special
relationship among its shareholders. Instead, these must, in their en-
tirety, be created and contained in the agreement.
The broad test selected for the corporation's eligibility under 591 is the
absence of a public market for the trading of the corporation's stock,87
rather than the arbitrary and more restrictive test of an upper limit on
the number of shareholders. 8 Finally, eligibility does not require that
there be restrictions on the transfer of the stockholders' shares.8 9
In opting for the exclusivity of the agreement, the drafters departed
from a fundamental principle of corporation law, which has been followed
in the close corporation legislation of most other states. These laws
require that the election of close corporation status and the adoption of
radical departures from the corporate norm be set forth in the charter
document.90 Taking into consideration the purposes of special close
corporation legislation, as well as the legitimate interests of all affected
parties, there appears to be no justification for making special charter
provisions a prerequisite to special close corporation status.91 In some
8 See infra text accompanying note 98.
s The following are examples of the more restrictive test: thirty in Delaware, DEL. COD
ANN. tit. 8, § 342 (1983); thirty in Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1372 A.1 (Purdon
Supp. 1986); twenty in Maine, Ms. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 102.5 (1981); and thirty-five
in California (increased from ten as contained in the original 1975 statute), CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 158(a)(West 1986). The test in the MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT § 3(b), although numerical,
takes a novel approach. It requires that the corporation have no more than fifty sharehold-
ers at the time of its election, but termination of close corporation status can occur only by
shareholder action revoking it. Thus, an increase of the number of shareholders beyond
fifty, or even a public share offering will not result in the loss of close corporation status. See
MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 27, at 1811 (Official Comment to § 3).
89 Restrictions on transfer are required for eligibility in most other close corporation
statutes. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342(a)(2)(1983); MD. CoRPs & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §
4-503 (1985). In most instances, restrictions on the transfer of shares will be an indispens-
able element of sound close corporation planning. See infra text under heading "Need for
Additional Legislation - Share Transfer Restrictions." A form of multi-shareholder close
corporation agreement is contained in Appendix C. However, the drafters concluded that it
was unwise to deny the use of 591 to an otherwise eligible corporation whose shareholders,
for their own special reason, choose not to impose restrictions on transfer. See Karjala,
supra note 64, at 1257.
90 See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT SuPP. § 10 (1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 351
(1983); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 450.1463 (1986).
" See Bradley, supra note 84, at 553; Kessler, supra note 39, at 670-73; O'Neal, Close
Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 Bus. LAW 873, 880
(1978). In addition, recent New York decisions cast serious doubt on the effectiveness of
requiring charter provisions. They have held that an agreement among all shareholders is
enforceable in spite of the failure of the corporate charter to include the disputed provisions
as mandated by the applicable statute. Adler v. Svingos, 80 A.D.2d 764, 436 N.Y.S.2d 719
(1981)(New York law applied); Zion v. Kurtz, 50 N.Y.2d 92, 405 N.E.2d 681, 428 N.Y.S.2d
199 (1980)(a four to three decision applying Delaware law).
The illogic of requiring charter provisions is demonstrated by the partnership analogy.
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instances, third parties dealing with the corporation will want to ascer-
tain whether or not a close corporation agreement is in existence.
However, in lieu of an examination of the articles of incorporation for
that purpose, they can just as effectively, by the exercise of diligence,
make that determination in other ways.9 2 Present and future sharehold-
ers of the corporation likewise stand to gain no unique protection from
special charter provisions.9 3 Under 591, the former are protected by the
requirement of unanimous shareholder participation in the close corpo-
ration agreement, 94 and the latter by the requirement that all stock
certificates bear a legend indicating the enterprise's close corporation
status.95
VI. EXPLANATION OF 591
As emphasized above, 591's sole purpose is to validate and provide the
ground rules governing a close corporation agreement among the corpo-
ration's shareholders. Although the section is fairly lengthy and consists
of fourteen divisions,96 it accomplishes no more and no less than that.
This portion of the article focuses on the specific provisions of 591.
Rather than treating each division of 591 in its alphabetical order, the
following is a functional approach to an analysis of the statute.
Public recording is a concept foreign to partnership law, except in the case of a limited
partnership, where the requirement of filing a certificate is for the purpose of alerting third
parties to the reduced financial commitment of the limited partners. REVISED UNIFORM
LIrrED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 201 Comment, 6 Uniform Laws Ann. (1985 Supp.). In contrast,
practically any person dealing with a corporation is aware that he or she is looking solely
to the corporate assets, and this remains true regardless of whether or not it is a regular
corporation or a statutory close corporation. Thus, aspects of the internal relationship
among shareholders and matter of corporate governance are irrelevant to the rights of
creditors and other third parties. See Kessler, supra note 39, at 696. Professor Kessler is also
critical of the required bifurcation of provisions between the agreement and the charter, as
being unnecessary, confusing, and a possible trap for the unwary. Kessler, supra note 39, at
697,699. It should be pointed out, in addition, that the result of many of the laws is an even
more complicated trifurcation of provisions governing the ongoing affairs of the corporation
among the agreement, the charter document, and sections of the statute itself. See, e.g.,
MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT §§ 11-15; M.D. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 4-404 (1985).
92 See Karjala, supra note 64, at 1262. 591(B) was added by the 1985 amendments for
the purpose of providing added protection to third parties dealing with the corporation. See
infra note 104 and accompanying text.
93 O.R.C. § 1701.08(B), provides that no person dealing with an Ohio corporation is
charged with constructive notice of the contents of its filed articles of incorporation.
94 591(A)(1). See Kessler, supra note 39, at 672.
" 591(H), See Kessler, supra note 39, at 672. If there is a failure to denote the existence
of a close corporation agreement by a legend on the stock certificate and, as a result,
someone purchases the stock without knowledge of the close corporation agreement, the
agreement becomes invalid under 591(I). See infra text accompanying note 106.
" As stressed above, great pains were taken to assure that the statute is not
complicated. Practically all of the operative provisions are contained in divisions (A) and
(C).
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1987
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
A. Eligibility, Formalities, and Termination
Any Ohio corporation organized for profit,97 regardless of the number of
its shareholders, may be the subject of a close corporation agreement,
unless its shares are listed on a national securities exchange or are
regularly quoted in the over-the-counter market. 98 The subsequent
occurrence of such listing or quotation will invalidate the agreement. 99
An agreement qualifies under 591 if (1) all of the shareholders, whether
owning voting or nonvoting stock, assent to it, 100 (2) the agreement is set
forth in the articles of incorporation, code of regulations or another
written instrument, and (3) the agreement states that it is to be governed
by 591.101 Because there must be unanimous assent of shareholders, as a
practical matter, corporations with many shareholders, although techni-
cally eligible if their shares are not publicly traded, will be unable to
qualify under 591.102
There are few required formalities. In addition to the agreement itself,
it is necessary that the stock certificates bear a legend indicating the
existence of the agreement 0 3 and that an agreement not set forth in the
articles or the regulations be entered in the minutes of the sharehold-
ers. 0 4 The failure to comply with either of these two requirements will
" Professional corporations governed by O.R.C. Chapter 1785 are among the most likely
candidates for a close corporation agreement, since, by their nature, especially the active
participation of all shareholders, they invariably are the classic close corporation. See supra
text accompanying notes 12 and 13. See Z. & M. CAVITCH, OHIO CORPORATION LAW WITH
FEDERAL TAX ANALYSIS § 2.19 [7][e] (1986).
9s 591(I).
99 Id.
100 The corporation itself need not be a party to the agreement in order to be bound by it.
Any doubt as to this was removed by the 1985 amendments, which added to the introductory
paragraph of 591(C) the dependent clause "which shall be binding on the corporation and all
of its shareholders .. " It is, however, advisable to include the corporation as a party in
order to retain maximum residual effectiveness of the agreement in the event of its sub-
sequent non-consensual termination. See infra text under heading "Explanation of 591-
Savings Clause." See also Z. & M. CAviTcH supra note 97, at § 2.19 [7][el.
101 591(A). See also O.R.C. § 1701.01(x), for the definition of "close corporation agree-
ment," which is merely a reference to the three requirements of 591(A).
102 See Omo GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 93 (Judson-Brooks ed. 1986)("Committee Com-
ment (1981)" to 591); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 620 (McKinney Supp. 1980)(Comment);
Johnson, supra note 79, at 794.
103 591(H).
14 591(B). This provision was added by the 1985 amendments. Its purpose is to facilitate
the corporation's dealings with third parties. The effect, under O.R.C. § 1701.92(c), of
entering a close corporation agreement in the minutes is to make a copy of it, which is
certified by the secretary or assistant secretary, conclusive in favor of a nonshareholder who
has relied on it in good faith. Like treatment would be accorded the officer's certification
that no close corporation agreement is in effect.
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not invalidate the close corporation agreement.10 5 Invalidation could
later occur, however, as a result of the transfer of a stock certificate
bearing no legend to a person who takes other than by gift, bequest, or
inheritance and without knowledge of the agreement. 10 6 A transferee of
share certificates bearing a legend is conclusively deemed to have taken
delivery with notice of the agreement and is bound by it.107 In keeping
with the legend requirement, a corporation having a close corporation
agreement in effect may not issue shares in uncertificated form, 08 as
otherwise permitted by Ohio law.'0 9
Action to amend or terminate a close corporation agreement can be
taken by a four-fifths vote of the shares of each class, unless the
agreement requires a greater percentage of any class." 0
105 A failure to file the agreement with the minutes is specifically covered by 591(F)(4),
but there is no provision dealing with the effect of a failure to legend the stock certificates.
The clear implication of division (I), however, is that there is no impact of such latter failure
unless followed by an invalidating transfer.
iee 591(I). This division provides that invalidation occurs subsequent to any such
transfer, if the transferee does not consent in writing to the close corporation agreement
within thirty days after issuance of a stock certificate in the name of the transferee or his
nominee. The event in the original law that triggered the beginning of the thirty-day period
was receipt by the transferee of a copy of the close corporation agreement. It was changed
by the 1985 amendments to issuance of a stock certificate in the transferee's name. In
addition, the amendments added the obligation of an officer, who learns of invalidity, to
notify all shareholders immediately. See OHio GENERAL CORORATION LAW 94 (Judson-Brooks
ed. 1986)("Committee Comment (1985)" to 591). If the invalid agreement appears in the
articles of incorporation, it is required that action be taken to file a certificate of amendment
to the articles deleting the agreement. Invalidation of the agreement does not necessarily
mean that none of its provisions will remain enforceable. Instead, there will be voided only
those provisions that would be illegal under Ohio law absent the sanction provided by 591.
See infra text under the heading "Explanation of 591-Savings Clause."
107 591(H).
108 591(M).
1o9 O.R.C. § 1701.24(F).
11o 591(E). Obviously, in order to gain lasting protection, a shareholder owning twenty
percent or less of the stock must make sure that the agreement contains a provision
increasing the size of the majority vote required to amend or terminate to the extent
necessary to give the shareholder a veto. For the recommendation that 591(E) be amended
to provide that the vote to amend or terminate a close corporation agreement be increased
to one hundred percent, see infra text under heading "Need for Additional Legislation-
Improving 591."
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B. What Can Be Accomplished by a Close Corporation Agreement111
Division (C) is the heart of 591, in that it specifies in depth the
permissible subject matter of a close corporation agreement. 112
The key language is contained in the opening paragraph of 591(C),
which permits the agreement, "[i]rrespective of any other provisions of
[the OGCL],""13 to regulate "any aspect of the internal affairs of the
corporation or the relations of the shareholders among themselves.. .. "
The effect of this broad, yet clearly defined, grant of authority is that,
except for precise narrow limitations set forth in division (D),1 14 the sky
is the limit regarding the corporation's internal affairs and the share-
holders' relations inter se, but that provisions attempting to affect the
rights of third parties are out of bounds. The full scope of the subject
matter authorized for inclusion in the agreement is better appreciated
when division (C) is considered together with division (F) of 591. The
latter rules out attacks on the agreement on grounds that it departs from
corporate norms or treats the corporation as if it were a partnership. 1 5
The agreement's grant of authority under division (C) encompasses both
procedural matters designed to simplify the structure and operation of
" The reader is cautioned that certain provisions of a close corporation agreement could
adversely affect the status of the corporation as an S corporation under Subchapter S of the
Internal Revenue Code. The danger lies in the requirement under I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D)
that a corporation, in order to be eligible for Subchapter S treatment, not have more than
a single outstanding class of stock. Differences in the rights adhering to stock held by
parties to the agreement might be considered to create a disqualifying second class of stock.
I.R.C. § 1361(c)(4) provides that a difference among shareholders in voting rights will not
give rise to more than one class. However, differences in regard to the distribution of profits
or assets may result in the Internal Revenue Service asserting the existence of a second
class. See Z. & M. CAVITCH, supra note 97, at § 2.19[71[a]; D. SCHENK, FEDERAL TAXATION OF S
COm'ORATIONS § 404 (1985). At the other extreme, there would appear to be no danger in the
Sixth Judicial Circuit that the existence of a close corporation agreement would jeopardize
the corporation's right to be taxed as a corporation under the Internal Revenue Code. See Z.
& M. CAVITCH, supra note 97 at § 2.19[71[b]. See also, Wang, supra note 82, at 717-27
(thorough discussion of federal tax problems that might result from the adoption of a
"shareholders' agreement" pursuant to § 300(b) of California's close corporation provisions).
... This is 591's most significant point of departure from the scheme of the pioneering
North Carolina statute. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
113 The addition of the "irrespective" clause was the most important of the clarifications
effected by the 1985 amendments. The clause is intended to remove any doubt that an
agreement adopted in accordance with the requirements of division (A) of 591 and within
the scope specified in division (C) can override any other provision of the OGCL, except the
"untouchable" sections listed in division (D). The clause had appeared in earlier drafts of the
original law, but was inadvertently dropped prior to its introduction in the General
Assembly.
114 See infra text under the heading "Explanation of 591-Express Limitation on the Scope
of a Close Corporation Agreement."
... See infra text under the heading "Explanation of 591-Negation of Traditional
Obstacles."
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corporate governance and substantive matters dealing with management
and control.116
Following its broad opening paragraph, division (C) contains a "laun-
dry list" of eleven items that are included in the broad grant. The laundry
list is a comprehensive catalog, culled from the close corporation statutes
of various states, of specific items sanctioned for agreement among
shareholders. It does not, of course, limit the scope of the grant."17 The
laundry list has two purposes. One is the express statutory recognition of
the legitimacy of these traditionally sensitive topics for inclusion in a
close corporation agreement."l 8 The other serves the practical function of
alerting counsel to a list of the more prominent areas to explore with
clients, who wish to form a close corporation. 119
While again stressing that there are few internal matters that cannot,
pursuant to the opening paragraph of division (C), be the subject of a close
corporation agreement, attention is next directed to specific items of the
laundry list.
Perhaps the most revolutionary of the group, and one that has become
a hallmark of modern close corporation legislation, is the ability to
eliminate the board of directors.' 20 The result of such action is that the
shareholders are deemed to be the directors to the extent not inconsistent
with the agreement, and that they succeed to the rights and liabilities of
directors. 12 1 This same item of the laundry list also permits a lesser
116 Procedural and substantive matters frequently overlap when control and manage-
ment are involved. For example, elimination of the board of directors necessarily involves
the determination by the shareholders of the persons on whom authority will be conferred
to fill the vacuum.
.'. An early draft of the statute contained that venerable redundancy "including, but not
limited to" preceding the laundry list. However, the Ohio Legislative Service Commission,
which must approve the form of all bills introduced in the Ohio General Assembly,
commendably disapproved the use of "but not limited to" as being unnecessary and
undesirable. The Maryland legislature is on record as being in accord. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS
CODE ANN. § 4-401 (1985)(Revisor's Note).
118 See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
119 A checklist of this type adds an educational function to the statute. Recent corpora-
tion laws indicate a possible trend in this direction. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.111 (West
1985)(Reporter's Notes)(cited in Note, Minnesota Business Corporations Act: Greater
Freedom for Corporations, 66 MINN. L. REV. 1022, 1034-35 (1982)). Regarding counsel's
responsibility to clients in a situation where the need for close corporation planning is
indicated, see supra note 64 and infra text accompanying note 261.
120 591(C)(8). Discarding the board of directors would make sense in most single
shareholder corporations.
12' 592(G). The transfer of liability to shareholders strongly suggests the appropriateness
of the close corporation agreement addressing protection for any shareholder who will not
participate in management. This might take the form of an indemnity from those who will
be exercising the management function. Under the MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT, if a corporation
has eliminated the board of directors, a shareholder is not liable for any act or omission,
although a director would be, unless the shareholder was entitled to vote on the action.
1987]
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degree of displacement of the directors, in the form of restrictions on or
delegation of their authority. 122
Another item of the laundry list aimed at achieving informality is the
ability to avoid the requirement of having two persons sign documents, 123
by authorizing an individual holding more than one office to execute
instruments in more than one capacity. 124 Thus, in the one shareholder
corporation, the way has been cleared to eliminate, as in a sole propri-
etorship, the need for even the nominal involvement of any other
individual in internal corporate affairs. 25 This would be achieved by
discarding the board of directors and, in addition, designating the sole
shareholder to fill all of the offices, with authority to execute any
document in all his capacities. Such steps for the single shareholder
corporation might well be taken by including in the articles of incorpo-
ration a short close corporation agreement effectuating these procedural
simplifications.126
The remaining laundry list items are concerned with the more signif-
icant substantive area of establishing the rights of individual sharehold-
ers vis-a-vis the corporation and other shareholders. In most cases these
will be the building blocks for a wall of minority shareholder protection.
Items concerned with protecting a shareholder's right to continuing
income are the conferring of employment and compensation rights, with
MODEL ACT SuPPLEMENT § 21(C)(3). See infra text accompanying notes 169-71 recommending
adoption of this approach as an amendment to 591.
122 591(C)(8) permits delegation of the directors' authority to "other persons," as well as
shareholders. This allows delegation to an outsider such as a management company, action
that in the absence of 591 would be illegal. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 11, at
575.
123 The signatures of two prescribed officers are required by the OGCL for certificates
filed with the Secretary of State with respect to an amendment to the articles of
incorporation, a merger or consolidation, or a dissolution. O.R.C. §§ 1701.73, 1701.81,
1701.86.
124 591(c)(5). Cf. O.R.C. § 1701.64(a), which provides the opposite, but, of course, is
subject to overriding action pursuant to 591. The Ohio Secretary of State has prescribed a
form of "Close Corporation Affidavit," which "must accompany any certificate of amend-
ment, dissolution, merger or consolidation that is signed by one person in two corporate
capacities under § 1701.591 of the Ohio Revised Code."
"' Practical considerations may, of course, dictate that another trusted person have the
authority to execute documents on behalf of the corporation, in the event of the sharehold-
er's unavailability.
126 This is in contrast to the corporation where there are several shareholders and special
arrangements relating to management, vetoes, compensation and other confidential mat-
ters are a part of the agreement. In that situation, in the interest of achieving confidenti-
ality and ease of amendment, it would seem inadvisable to spread the close corporation
agreement on the public records by including it in the articles of incorporation rather than
in a private instrument. See 2 J. BLACKFORD, OHIO CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 15.181
(1985). For a form of a single shareholder close corporation agreement embodied in the
articles of incorporation, see Appendix B.
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no limitation as to duration,1 27 and provisions governing distributions,
dividends or division of profits. 128 Items concerned with protecting a
shareholder's investment are: restricting the right of the corporation to
sell either treasury stock or newly issued shares 129 and the power of one
or more shareholders to cause the dissolution of the corporation.130 Items
directed to assuring rights to participate in management and major
decisions are: permanent officer or director status;' 3 ' unanimous or other
percentage voting requirements; 32 the obligation to vote shares as
specified;' 33 and conferring on a shareholder the absolute right of access
to corporate records and documents. 34
The final item of the laundry list authorizes arbitration as a means of
breaking deadlocks among directors, as well as shareholders.
1 35
127 591(C)(6).
128 591(C)(7). This could include, for example, the mandatory payment of regular
dividends or a distribution formula that differs from individual shareholdings. The possible
effect of the latter type of provision on the corporation's Subchapter S tax status must be
carefully considered. See supra note 111.
129 591(C)(10). Protection of this type could be expected ordinarily to go far beyond the
pre-emptive rights conferred by O.R.C. § 1701.15, which are subject to a number of
exceptions, including several that are quite broad. See supra note 46.
131 591(C)(2).
132 591(C)(4).
132 591(C)(3).
... Id. These few words are the only provision of the OGCL regarding voting (or
"pooling") agreements among shareholders. In a voting agreement, the shareholders agree
to vote their shares in a certain way on various matters or to pool their votes and cast them
as a unit. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 11, at 535. Regarding the validity in Ohio of
voting agreements that are not contained in a close corporation agreement, see infra note
156.
134 591(C)(9). This item eliminates the requirement of stating a "reasonable and proper
purpose" under O.R.C. § 1701.37, which can be a difficult obstacle to overcome, often
resulting in litigation. See Lake v. Buckeye Steel Casting Co., 2 Ohio St. 2d 101, 206 N.E.2d
566 (1965). A shareholder's statutory right to inspection under O.R.C. § 1701.37 cannot be
eliminated by a close corporation agreement. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
135 591(C)(11). Arbitration, as a dispute resolution device, should be compared to
appointment of a provisional director pursuant to O.R.C. § 1701.911. The latter section is
intended to serve a somewhat similar purpose and is the most recent provision, prior to 591,
added to the OGCL primarily for the benefit of close corporations. See Omno GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW 151 (Judson-Brooks ed. 1986)("Committee Comment (1977)" to O.R.C.
§ 1701.911). In contrast to arbitration pursuant to a close corporation agreement, the right
to the appointment of a provisional director is highly restricted by the statute. The right
must be provided in the articles of incorporation or code of regulations. The appointment
must be sought by a petition filed in the court of common pleas by not less than one-fourth
of the directors or holders of one-fifth of the outstanding voting shares, and the petitioners
must establish irreconcilable differences among the directors that have substantially
impeded or made impossible the corporation's continued operations. The appointment is
made by the court and the appointee serves until removed by the court or by holders of a
majority of the voting shares. Access to the provisional director remedy, as for adoption of
a close corporation agreement, requires elective action on the part of the corporation.
Therefore,
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Practically none of the management and control items of the laundry
list could have been achieved prior to the enactment of 591 by the use of
a single agreement among shareholders. Certain of the goals could likely
have been accomplished by going "over under and through"'136 the OGCL
by a combination of the devices of different classes of stock, an individual
agreement between the corporation and each shareholder, and provisions
in the articles of incorporation or code or regulations. 37 The simplifica-
tion of corporate planning by permitting, instead, a single agreement
allowing the parties to achieve their purpose directly and with certainty
is sufficient justification for the enactment of 591. However, in addition,
no matter how creative the documentation, prior to 591, the legality of
granting lifetime officer status and employment rights was highly
doubtful, 138 and there was clearly no lawful way to eliminate the board of
directors 39 or to arbitrate deadlocks at the director level.140
C. Express Limitations on the Scope of a Close Corporation Agreement
The permitted scope of a close corporation agreement is limited by
specific reference in division (D) of 591 to certain other provisions of the
OGCL.141 Division (D) invalidates any provision of a close corporation
agreement that tampers with OGCL requirements governing the filing of
assuming shareholder unanimity is present, it is hard to conceive of a situation where it
would not be preferable to adopt a close corporation agreement providing for arbitration as
a dispute resolution device, rather than to go the provisional director route. The advantages
of arbitration over a provisional director are obvious and great. Arbitration can be used to
resolve any type of issue, not just director deadlocks. It is a simpler, more temporary, and
less expensive remedy. It avoids court proceedings and a judicial appointment, possibly
motivated by patronage or cronyism, as well as the intrusion of a stranger on the board of
directors, whose presence may exacerbate rather than alleviate the underlying causes of
shareholder friction.
1 See Ginsberg, supra note 14, at 9.
'3 See MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT at 1806 (Introductory Comment). The position taken there
is that "by the use of sophisticated contracts among the shareholders and special provisions
in the articles of incorporation and by-laws" any desired result achievable under the MODEL
ACT SUPPLEMENT can be achieved under the REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT (1984),
but that the SUPPLEMENT provides the advantages of certainty, flexibility, less drafting and
lower probability that some factor has been overlooked. The same claim, however, cannot be
made for the OGCL, which hardly compares to the sleek, modernized REVISED MODEL
BusiNEss CORPORATION ACT. For example, the latter, in Section 8.01, goes so far as to duplicate
Section 21 of the MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT permitting elimination of the board of directors.
138 See F. O'NEAL, supra note 10, at §§ 6.05, 6.06.
139 See F. O'NEAL, supra note 10, at § 3.60.
14o See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 11, at 748; 11 0. JuR. 3d Business
Relationships, § 395, at 661 (1970).
141 The California close corporation law was the source of this provision. CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 300(c)(West 1986).
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documents with the Secretary of State and their prescribed form, 142 or
with the provisions of eighteen specified sections of the OGCL.
143
Protection of the uniformity of the form of documents filed with the
Secretary of State is self-explanatory. However, the reason for the list of
"untouchable" sections in division (D)(2) is less obvious and consists of
three distinct purposes. The first, which encompasses twelve of the
eighteen sections, 44 reinforces, in a belt and suspenders approach, the
limitation on the scope of a close corporation agreement to "internal
affairs of the corporation or the relations of the shareholders among
themselves."' 145 Thus, this purpose is mainly concerned with assurances
for creditors and other third parties dealing with the corporation.' 46 The
second purpose is far different. It represents a departure from 591's
freedom of contract approach by preserving certain minimum rights of
shareholders under the OGCL, which otherwise could be denied them by
a close corporation agreement.1 47 In this category are the rights to an
annual financial statement, 148 the holding of an annual meeting,149 and
the inspection of corporate records for a reasonable and proper purpose. '5 0
The third purpose is concerned simply with protection against invalida-
142 591(D)(1).
143 591(D)(2).
144 O.R.C. §§ 1701.03, 1701.18, 1701.30, 1701.31, 1701.32, 1701.33, 1701.35, 1701.64,
1701.91, 1701.93, 1701.94 and 1701.95.
145 591(C).
14' Included in these twelve sections are the traditional measures to preserve the
integrity of the corporation's capital by limitations contained in O.R.C. §§ 1701.30
(requirement of stated capital), 1701.31 (reduction of stated capital) and 1701.32 (regulation
of surplus), and by restricting the source of dividends and stock redemptions in O.R.C.
§§ 1701.33 and 1701.35. A concession to the traditional corporate form for the purpose of
facilitating dealing with third parties is the retention of the requirement that there be
corporate officers as required by the first sentence of O.R.C. § 1701.64.
147 A major purpose of 591 is to facilitate protection of minority shareholders by
removing the barriers to a freely negotiated agreement between the majority and the
minority factions. Yet, if certain mandatory shareholder protection provisions of the OGCL
were not made off limits, the freedom of contract conferred on the parties by 591 could be
used to increase the vulnerability of minority shareholders to oppression by the majority.
The argument that the minority will have assented to same with full knowledge of the
consequences may be of doubtful validity, depending on the minority's bargaining power,
sophistication and other practical factors present at the time the corporate venture is
organized. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
'48 O.R.C. § 1701.38.
149 O.R.C. § 1701.39. See infra text accompanying notes 172-76 for a recommended
amendment to 591 to permit dispensing with the annual meeting, unless it has been
formally requested by a shareholder.
150 O.R.C. § 1701.37(C). In addition, divisions (A) and (B) of this section require the
corporation to maintain books and records, and a list of shareholders. Cf. 591(C)(9), which
permits the close corporation agreement to confer an absolute right on shareholders to
access to the corporate records. See supra note 134.
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tion of the close corporation agreement by an errant transfer of stock to
an innocent purchaser.1 5'
D. Other Shareholder Agreements
591 has revolutionized preexisting Ohio law relating to agreements
among shareholders, but it has not displaced the preexisting law by
providing the exclusive means of creating an agreement among share-
holders."52 There is, however, no section of the OGCL relating to an
agreement among shareholders that does not conform to the require-
ments of 591.153 The single short sentence comprising division (L)
eliminates any possible negative implication to be drawn from 591
concerning the validity of these nonconforming agreements. On the other
hand, there would seem to be no reason why any agreement to which
every shareholder of the corporation is a party, regardless of its content,
should not be made a close corporation agreement under 591. Thus, there
would be included in the single agreement every aspect of the sharehold-
ers' contractual agreements, whether partaking of the laundry list of
division (C) or not.154 That action would procure the protection of 591 for
the agreement, and there could be no corresponding detriment in the
event of the occurrence of an invalidating event under division (I),155
since any possible taint of one provision on another would be removed by
the division's savings clause.
E. Savings Clause
If the special protection of 591 is lost because of the occurrence of an
invalidating event under division (I), the entire agreement, unless it
otherwise provides, is not automatically nullified. Instead, under the
savings clause contained in division (I), the validity of each individual
151 O.R.C. §§ 1701.24 and 1701.25 require that ownership of shares be evidenced by the
issuance of stock certificates in the prescribed form. Division (F) of O.R.C. § 1701.24,
permitting the existence of uncertificated shares, is made inoperative by 591(M), for any
corporation that is the subject of a close corporation agreement. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 105-09 (concerning the invalidation of a close corporation agreement resulting
from the transfer of an unlegended stock certificate).
1i2 591(L).
"'3 A non-591 agreement among shareholders will often take the form of a "voting
agreement." See supra note 133. Regarding the validity of voting agreements and possible
legislation to clarify their validity, see infra note 156.
'" The most common provisions not covered by the laundry list would be restrictions on
the transfer of shares. For recommended legislation to recognize the validity of specific
types of transfer restrictions, see infra text under heading "Need for additional Legislation-
Share Transfer Restrictions."
"' There are only two such events under 591(I), either the commencement of public
trading in the stock or an unauthorized transfer of shares to a bona fide purchaser for value.
See supra text accompanying notes 99 & 106.
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provision of the agreement will be tested under other applicable Ohio law
and, to the extent it is not invalid thereunder, will continue to be binding
on the parties.'
56
F. Negation of Traditional Obstacles
Few doctrines are more deeply rooted in American corporation law
than the restrictive rules sought to be nullified by 591.157 Therefore,
prudence dictated that division (C)'s positive action in sanctioning the
subject matter for inclusion in a close corporation agreement be bolstered
by the additional assurance provided by division (F). The effect of division
(F) is to immunize a freewheeling close corporation agreement from
attack based on assertions that the agreement treats the corporation as if
it were a partnership or the shareholders as if they were partners;158 or
that it provides for conducting the affairs of the corporation or relations
among its shareholders in a manner that would be improper under the
OGCL or other applicable law;159 or that it interferes with the authority
or discretion of the directors. 1
60
A similar provision with, however, a different purpose is found in
division (K). There the failure, pursuant to a close corporation agree-
ment, to observe corporate formalities relating to directors' or sharehold-
156 Voting agreements among shareholders, which are not embodied in a valid close
corporation agreement, are presumably legal in Ohio under the common law, if they do not
have the effect of sterilizing the board of directors. Their status, however, is far from clear.
See 12 0. JUR. 3d Business Relationships, § 576 (1970)(voting or pooling agreements). See
also supra text accompanying notes 22-24. To be contrasted with the absence in the OGCL
of any treatment of voting agreements (other than the brief mention in the 591(C)(3)
laundry list) is the statutory recognition of voting trusts, which are authorized by O.R.C.
§ 1701.49, and are limited to a ten-year term, unless coupled with an interest. Most other
states have laws enacted independently of special close corporation legislation, which
generally recognize the rights of shareholders to enter into a written voting agreement.
These statutes also declare the voting agreement's independence from statutory restrictions
on voting trusts and provide for their enforcement by the remedy of specific performance.
The annotation to MODEL BUSINESS ACT ANNOTATED § 7.31 (1984) lists thirty-six states that
have statutes of this type (including an erroneous reference to Ohio). See, e.g., ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 32 § 7.70 (Hurd-Smith Supp. 1985). Ohio might well give consideration to the
adoption of such a statute to clarify the formalities required and enforcement remedies
available for non-591 voting agreements. Of course, the enforceability of any particular
provision of such an agreement would continue to be governed by provisions of the OGCL
(other than 591) and by Ohio common law. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANNOT. § 7.31
(1984)(Official Comment). This would mean that, depending on the subject matter of the
agreement, uncertainty as to validity could still be removed only by qualification as a close
corporation agreement under 591. Nevertheless, in situations where less than all the
shareholders are parties to the agreement, the adoption of such a statute would be a
desirable improvement to the existing law.
157 See supra text under heading "Overview of Close Corporation Legislation."
158 591(F)(1).
159 591(F)(2).
160 591(F)(3).
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ers' meetings is eliminated as a factor in a court's determination of
whether or not to pierce the corporate veil. 161
G. Enforcement of Close Corporation Agreement
It is 591's intent that its policy favoring freedom of contract among
shareholders not be frustrated by the refusal of a court to require a valid
close corporation agreement to be performed pursuant to its terms.
Accordingly, division (J) expressly authorizes a court of equity to enforce
a close corporation agreement by injunction or specific performance. The
division's purpose is to assure that a court will be sympathetic to the
position of a person seeking specific enforcement, in the face of a claim
that the requested relief is barred by availability of an adequate remedy
at law. 162
VII. THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL LEGISLATION
In this section, consideration will be given to possible further legisla-
tive action by the Ohio General Assembly to improve and complete the
statutory plan for the Ohio close corporation. Attention will be directed to
three topics; first to slight improvements in 591, next to validating stock
transfer restrictions, and finally, to providing relief from shareholder
oppression. 163
161 The close corporation statutes of a number of states include a provision of this type.
See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(B)(West 1986). See also MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT § 25. Rarely,
however, have courts relied solely on informality in the conduct of a corporation's affairs as
the basis for imposing personal liability on shareholders. See Downs, Piercing the Corporate
Veil Do Corporations Provide Limited Personal Liability?, 53 UMKC L. REV. 174, 175
(1985); Karjala, supra note 64, at 1216. Comment, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Maryland:
An Analysis and Suggested Approach, 14 BALTIMORE L. REV. 322 (1985). Adoption of a close
corporation agreement should not, of course, have any effect on an attempt to pierce the
corporate veil based on other grounds, such as undercapitalization.
162 See OHIO GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 93 (Judson-Brooks ed. 1986)("Committee Com-
ment (1981)" to 591).
16 Mention is made above of the four components of a complete close corporation
statutory scheme. See supra text accompanying notes 29-33. In enacting 591, Ohio has
provided the means for the corporation to achieve informality in its internal operations and
for the shareholders to reach agreement regarding management and control. Left unaddres-
sed by 591, however, are transfer restrictions and shareholder oppression. The drafting of a
close corporation law for the state of Ohio was a project commenced by the Close
Corporation Subcommittee of the Corporation Law Committee of the Ohio State Bar
Association in late 1977. See Report of the Corporation Law Committee, 53 OHIO ST. B. ASS'N
REP. 510 (1980). The Subcommittee's original approach covered all four components. The
part designed to sanction a list of stock transfer restrictions and the part providing
self-executing relief in cases of shareholder oppression were dropped by the Corporation
Law Committee in the late 1970's. In 1982, legislation providing a shareholder oppression
remedy was again considered and rejected by the Committee. See Minutes of Meetings of the
Corporation Law Committee of the Ohio State Bar Association (Sept. 9, 1978, Mar. 3, 1979,
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A. Improving 591
Some Ohio lawyers have questioned the wisdom of permitting the close
corporation agreement, in the absence of a contrary provision, to be
amended or terminated by a four-fifths majority of all shares, 164 rather
than by unanimous shareholder approval as required for the original
authorization of the agreement. 165 The counterpart provisions of some
other close corporation statutes opt for a requirement of shareholder
unanimity for this purpose, 166 and commentators have voiced support for
unanimity.1 67 Four-fifths was originally selected by the drafters as a
concession to the belief that there should be a presumption in favor of
allowing the corporation's return to the corporate norm.1 68 However,
591's more dominant policy of providing protection for minority share-
holders argues for a reversal of the present statutory bias against an
unwary shareholder owning no more than 20% of the stock. Accordingly,
the statute should be amended to require unanimity for amendment or
termination of a close corporation agreement, unless the agreement
provides otherwise.
A provision of a close corporation agreement eliminating the board of
directors can exclude one or more shareholders from participating in the
substituted decision making process16 9 and yet, at present, the statute
provides that all of the shareholders succeed to the liability of the
directors.1 70 It would seem logical and fair, therefore, to add a provision
absolving from liability under division (G)(2) of 591 any shareholder of a
directorless corporation, who was not entitled to vote on the action giving
rise to the exposure.17 '
With respect to most close corporations, the statutorily required annual
meeting of shareholders is either ignored or is a meaningless exercise on
paper. Thus, it is unrealistic, when a close corporation agreement is in
effect, to preserve to its full extent the present inflexible requirement of
holding an annual meeting. 172 Therefore, as is provided by the laws of
Mar. 6, 1982). In view of subsequent developments and additional arguments advanced in
this section of the article, it is the writer's belief that reconsideration, in greater depth, of
the broadening of the scope of Ohio's close corporation legislation would be appropriate.
164 591(E).
165 591(A)(1).
' See, e.g., MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT § 20(f); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN.
§ 4-401(b)(1985); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 12.33B (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1986).
ie7 See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 39, at 666.
1 There is precedent for the present approach. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32 §§ 1205
and 1207. (Smith-Hurd 1970 Supp. 1985)(unanimity required for original election as close
corporation and two-thirds for termination).
169 591(C)(8),
170 591(G).
'71 Cf. MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT § 21(c)(3); MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 4-401(b)(1985).
172 An annual meeting is mandatory under O.R.C. § 1701.39, and that section appears as
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other states, 173 the statute should permit a close corporation agreement
to dispense with the annual meeting, unless a shareholder timely
requests it.17 4 In any event, the truly valuable right of shareholders
under O.R.C. § 1701.38 to receive the corporation's annual financial
statement 175 satisfies the essential purpose of an annual meeting in the
case of most close corporations. 17 6
B. Share Transfer Restrictions
There is no requirement under 591 that shareholders agree to restric-
tions on the transfer of their shares in order that their agreement qualify
as a close corporation agreement, 77 nor, on balance, does it appear that
such a requirement would be advantageous. 178 However, in the vast
majority of close corporations, such restrictions are highly desirable and
will be an essential element of the overall plan adopted by sharehold-
ers. 1
79
an "untouchable" in division (D)(2) of 591. As is true with respect to a number of provisions
of the OGCL, a close corporation agreement will likely supplant action that might otherwise
be taken by a vote of shareholders at an annual meeting.
173 See, e.g., MD. CoRPs. & ASs'NS CODE ANN. § 4-402 (1985); MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT § 23(b).
174 The preferable way to accomplish this change would be by retaining O.R.C. § 1701.39
as an "untouchable" in division (D)(2) of 591 and, instead, amending O.R.C. § 1701.39 to
permit this relaxation of the annual meeting requirement, if contained in a close corpora-
tion agreement.
175 This right is preserved as an "untouchable" under 591(D)(2).
17 If the mandatory annual meeting requirement were relaxed, a conforming amend-
ment to O.R.C. § 1701.38 would be necessary to assure continuation of the right to an
annual statement. This follows from the present requirement in O.R.C. § 1701.38 of the
presentation of the annual statement at the annual meeting and the mailing of the copy to
a shareholder requesting it within sixty days after notice of the meeting has been given.
'7 591(A). Even though the "laundry list" of 591(C) makes no reference to share transfer
restrictions, the subject is clearly appropriate for optional inclusion in a close corporation
agreement, as being within the broad grant of authority in the opening paragraph of 591(C).
See supra note 154.
178 The close corporation statutes of some other states do impose such a requirement. See,
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 342 (a)(2)(1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. § 1372.A(2)(Purdon Supp.
1985). The MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT prescribes a standardized transfer prohibition that
automatically applies unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise. MODEL ACT
SUPPLEMENT §§ 11 & 12. The drafters of 591, however, came to the conclusion that the use of
a close corporation agreement should not be denied to shareholders who, for their own
reasons, have decided not to impose transfer restrictions. See Karjala, supra note 64, at
1257. Moreover, the close corporation agreement itself, as publicized by the required legend
on the stock certificates, will serve to inhibit transfers.
179 As in the case of partners, close corporation shareholders most often desire to make
sure that the principle of delectus personae is applicable to their relationship. See Kessler,
supra note 39, at 665. The possible loss of the corporation's Subchapter S status under the
Internal Revenue Code by reason of the transfer of a stockholder's shares has, in recent
times, given added incentive to the adoption of transfer restrictions. See F. O'NEAL, supra
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Since stock transfer restrictions are a form of restraint against the
alienation of property, in the absence of authorizing legislation or judicial
sanction, their enforceability is uncertain.18 Absolute prohibitions on
transfer, unlimited in time, have traditionally been held to be unreason-
able restraints and, therefore, invalid."" In addition, restrictions requir-
ing the consent of the corporation or of the director or other shareholders
to the transfer of shares are of questionable validity.182 However,
restrictions conferring a right of first refusal on the part of the corpora-
tion or the other shareholders are generally upheld.'8 3
The OGCL is silent on the subject of the validity of transfer restric-
tions,1 84 and the Ohio decisions, although inconclusive, appear to follow
the established general rules.186
It would, therefore, be beneficial to clarify and facilitate this important
aspect of close corporation planning by the adoption of legislation broadly
recognizing the validity of the most common type transfer restrictions,
including the right of the corporation or shareholders to block a transfer
by withholding consent.18 6 The addition for this purpose of a new section
to the OGCL applicable to all corporations18 7 should be welcomed as
strengthening, independently of 591, the resources available to Ohio
close corporation planners.
note 10, at § 7.02. For reference to a different, although related, aspect of Subchapter S
status, see supra note 111.
180 See 2 J. BLACKFORD, supra note 126, at § 51.10; Note, supra note 14, at 627, 628.
1' F. O'NEAL, supra note 10, at § 7.06.
182 F. O'NEAL, supra note 10, at § 7.08; Rands, Closely Held Corporations: Restrictions on
Stock Transfers, 84 COM. L. J. 461, 464 (1979).
"8' F. O'NEAL, supra note 10, at § 7.09. Rands, supra note 181, at 463.
' O.R.C. § 1701.11(B)(8) merely authorizes inclusion in a corporation's code of regula-
tions of "restrictions on the right to transfer [shares]."
' See 62 0. JuR. 3d Investment Securities, §§ 30, 33 (1985); Barron, Arrangements
Validity and Enforcement of Restrictions on Share Transfer and Buy-Out. Various Types of
Restrictions in Ohio, 31 U. CIN. L. REv. 266, 267-69 (1962).
"86 As in the case of a partnership, the property law concept disfavoring restraints on
alienation should give way to the principles of delectus personae and freedom of contract
among the participants in the venture. See Johnson, supra note 79, at 798-99.
187 This would seem to be the better of two possible approaches and is the one adopted by
a number of states. F. O'NEAL, supra note 10, at § 7.06A. The alternative, a more limited
approach, would be to add another item to the "laundry list" in division (C) of 591 referring
generally to restrictions on share transfers, including the specific sanctioning of a "consent"
requirement. The objective would be, in keeping with the purpose of the laundry list, to
remove all doubt as to the validity of an otherwise invalid consent restriction in a close
corporation agreement. Presumably, this would overcome the common law impediment to
transfer restrictions based on principles of property law. It should not be overlooked that the
position can be taken that 591, in its present form, authorizes transfer restrictions
otherwise invalid under Ohio common law. Reliance for this proposition would be on the
opening paragraph of division (C), which broadly defines the permitted scope of a close
corporation agreement. See supra text accompanying notes 113-15.
1987]
31Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1987
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
C. Relief from Shareholder Oppression'8s
It is not a purpose of this article to cover this complex subject in great
depth.ls 9 However, substantial treatment is necessary, at the risk of
otherwise presenting a seriously incomplete assessment of the current
status under Ohio law of the close corporation and its shareholders,
especially minority shareholders. 9°
The traditional corporate structure and norms, especially the principle
of majority control and the business judgment rule, make it easy for those
in control of the corporation to take advantage of minority sharehold-
ers.' 91 In addition, the illiquidity of the latter's investment seals off any
means of escape.192
A major premise supporting the enactment of 591 is that the best
protection for shareholders in a close corporation is that for which they
have bargained as a result of engaging in advance planning with their
fellow shareholders.' 93 Ideally, the prospective business associates,
guided by competent and knowledgeable counsel,will work out an agree-
ment pursuant to 591 covering all pertinent reciprocal rights and
obligations. In the real world, it may only occasionally happen that way.
It must be recognized that, for any number of reasons, in most cases the
shareholder relationship will not be adequately provided for at the
inception of the venture. 194 As a result, situations will often arise later
where one faction will seek to exercise its power unfairly to the disad-
vantage of the other. Practically all such cases will involve oppression by
the majority directed against the minority, but the opposite is possible as
"'s The more descriptive terms "squeeze-out" and "partial squeeze-out" are employed by
Professors O'Neal and Thompson throughout their treatise to refer to the oppressive tactics
directed by controlling shareholders against minority shareholders. F. 0' NEAL & R.
THOMPSON, supra note 19.
1s9 Full treatment of the topic would require another article of equal or greater length.
Such an effort is unnecessary, however, due to the existing wealth of literature in the area,
consisting of the two-volume treatise by Professors O'Neal and Thompson, and numerous
articles including, most recently, Olson, A Statutory Elixir for the Oppression Malady, 36
MERCER L. REV. 627 (1985).
19o See infra note 263.
"' F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at § 3.03. See also Olson, supra note 189, at
627-28; Peeples, The Use and Misuse of the Business Judgment Rule in the Close
Corporation, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 456, 487 (1985); supra text accompanying notes 18-21.
192 See F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at § 2:15; Hetherington & Dooley, supra
note 81, at 6; Kessler, supra note 39, at 689. But see Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 24,
at 274-77.
193 See supra text under headings "Introduction" and "Objective, Philosophy and
Approach of 591."
94 See Hetherington and Dooley, supra note 81, at 36, 37; Olson, supra note 189, at 633;
Peeples, supra note 191, at 490, 491.
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a result of the oppressive exercise of contractual veto rights possessed by
the minority.195
Two recent Ohio cases involve typical fact patterns illustrating the
unfair treatment of a minority shareholder by the majority. In Estate of
Schroer v. Stamco Supply Inc.,196 the controlling shareholders caused the
corporation to repurchase the shares held by some members of their
group, while denying the same opportunity to the plaintiff minority
shareholder. In Soulas v. Troy Donut Univ., Inc., 97 two of the three equal
shareholders voted to increase their salaries to the point where the profit
of their subchapter S corporation,19s previously distributed equally
among the three, was eliminated. 199
The policy of providing strong judicial relief to close corporation
shareholders from oppressive action taken by the controlling faction can
no longer be disputed. The principle has been endorsed by the laws of a
number of states,20 0 judicial decisions,2 01 and virtual commentator una-
nimity. 20 2 These authorities have rejected the application of the tradi-
tional corporate norms discussed above20 3 as the standard by which to
measure the conduct of the controlling interest toward minority share-
holders. Instead, new standards have been formulated by them, in terms
of the majority's partnershiplike "fiduciary duty" to minority sharehold-
ers,204 and its obligation not to act "oppressively or unfairly"205 or in a
195 See Olson, supra note 189, at 638 n. 71. Oppressive conduct by the minority against
the majority is obviously a rare occurrence, and is likely to involve closer policy questions
since it is the allegedly wrongful exercise of a bargained-for right given presumably to
insure the minority's protection. Closer questions are also present where the minority is
asserting the misconduct of the majority in spite of the existence of a close corporation
agreement. In both situations it would seem that the plaintiff should be held to a heavier
burden to establish a right to relief. The balance of the discussion in this section will be in
the context of majority oppression of the minority, but much of it would be pertinent if the
opposite fact pattern was present. See MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT § 40, at 1852 (Official
Comment).
196 Estate of Schroer v. Stamco Supply, Inc., 19 Ohio App. 3d 34, 482 N.E.2d 975 (1984).
117 Soulas v. Troy Donut Univ. Inc., 9 Ohio App. 3d 339, 460 N.E.2d 310 (1983).
19 See supra notes 111 and 179 (concerning issues relating to corporations that have
elected Subchapter S status under the Internal Revenue Code).
199 The two cases are analyzed, infra in the text accompanying notes 212-221.
200 See, e.g., MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 450.1825(a)(West 1973 & Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 302A.751, Subd. 1(b)(2)(West 1980); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(1)(c)(West 1969
& Supp. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115 (1985). See also MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT § 40.
201 For a list of cases decided in the past sixteen years, see Olson, supra note 189, at 649.
202 For a list of articles, see Olson, supra note 189, at 629 n.14. But see Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 24, at 283-301.
203 See supra text accompanying notes 19-21 and 191.
204 See Estate of Schroer v. Stamco Supply, Inc., 19 Ohio App. 3d 34, 40, 482 N.E.2d 975
(1984); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975); see infra
text accompanying notes 215-18.
205 N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14A 12-7(1)(c)(West 1969 & Supp. 1985).
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"manner unfairly prejudicial" 206 toward the minority or in disregard of
the minority's "reasonable expectations. '2°7 This modern approach
shares a common rationale with preventive legislation such as 591, in the
recognition that the relationship of shareholders of a close corporation
should be governed by essentially the same principles as are applicable to
partners. 20
In spite of the well-established trend toward providing relief from
shareholder oppression, until recently there has been no progress in Ohio
on either the legislative or the judicial front. Ohio's laggard status is most
strikingly evidenced by its legislative inaction. Most other states have
provided a statutory remedy for at least the most severe oppressive
tactics against a shareholder, by making such wrongdoing a ground for
judicial dissolution.20 9 In addition, a number of states have enacted laws
making available to courts a variety of innovative and flexible remedies
to combat shareholder oppression. 210 However, in sharp contrast, the
OGCL, including its section on judicial dissolution,211 has remained
completely silent on the subject of shareholder oppression. There simply
is no statutory recognition in Ohio of the possible existence of such a
wrong, no matter how aggravated, for which a court might grant a
remedy.
On the judicial front, however, the silence recently ended with the
handing down of the above mentioned Schroer212 and Soulas213 decisions
at the appellate court level. In both of these cases, relief was granted to
a minority shareholder as a result of overreaching conduct on the part of
206 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751, Subd.1(b)(2)(West 1985). See also MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT
§ 40(a)(1).
20. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751, Subd.3a(West 1985).
208 See supra note 204.
209 See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 81, at 17 n.45. The shareholder oppression
legislation of other states is discussed infra, in notes 235-45 and accompanying text.
210 See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 450.1825 (West 1973 & Supp. 1980); S. C. CODE ANN.
§ 33-21-155 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.995(19)(West Supp. 1985)(pat-
terned after MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT §§ 41 & 42. See also supra notes 205-07.
211 O.R.C. § 1701.91, This section's only ground for dissolution relating to conflict among
shareholders is a deadlock on the part of directors in the management of corporate affairs,
or on the part of shareholders in the election of directors. O.R.C. § 1701.91(A)(4). A casual
reading of division (A)(3) of the section might suggest the possibility of a dissolution suit
based on shareholder oppression. The ground there stated is that dissolution would be
"beneficial to the shareholders." In the absence of a special provision in the articles,
however, the action may be brought only by shareholders owning a majority of voting
shares. Furthermore, this provision keys on protection of shareholders as a whole and is,
therefore, inapplicable to instances of majority oppression of the minority. See Hetherington
& Dooley, supra note 81, at 9-19.
212 See supra text accompanying note 196.
213 See supra text accompanying note 197.
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the majority, notwithstanding that the corporation's improper action had
been taken by authority of the board of directors. 214
In a strong opinion, the court in Schroer addressed what it found to be
questions of first impression in Ohio.215 The court affirmed the trial
court's order requiring the corporation to purchase the minority share-
holder's stock on the same basis as its earlier purchase of shares from a
member of the controlling shareholder group. In so doing, it held that the
controlling group owed an obligation to minority shareholders "substan-
tially akin to that fiduciary duty owed by one partner to another to deal
inter se in the utmost good faith."21 6 The court followed the leading case
of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.217 and quoted language from that
opinion establishing in unequivocal terms the existence of the partner-
like fiduciary duty among stockholders in a close corporation. 218 The
decision was not appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court.
The court in Soulas required the two majority shareholders to refund
excessive salaries paid to them by the corporation to the detriment of the
minority shareholder. The decision was based on a section of the OGCL
authorizing directors by majority vote to establish "reasonable" compen-
sation for services performed by directors and officers. 219 In addition to
finding that the compensation was unreasonable, the court did, in
dictum, recognize a cause of action by minority shareholders against
controlling shareholders for diversion of corporate profits at the expense
of the minority.220 However, the opinion nowhere else refers to any duty
of the majority to the minority, despite the strong assertion of the same
in the minority shareholder's brief.221
214 The court in Soulas apparently attached no significance to the fact that the aggrieved
minority director received no notice of the meeting of directors at which the two majority
directors, acting alone, increased their salaries. 9 Ohio App. 3d at 340-41, 460 N.E.2d at
312.
215 19 Ohio App. 3d at 34, 482 N.E.2d at 976.
216 19 Ohio App. 3d at 40, 482 N.E.2d at 981.
217 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
211 19 Ohio App. 3d at 39,482 N.E.2d at 981. The court also cited favorably another of the
early leading cases, Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal.3d 93,360 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr.
592 (1969), and the more recent decision in Alaska Plastics Co. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270
(Ala. 1980). In addition, it quoted with favor from the earlier edition of O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION
OF MINoRIn" SHAREHOLDERS.
219 O.R.C. § 1701.60(A)(3). See Soulas, 9 Ohio App.3d at 341, 460 N.E.2d at 312-13.
220 Soulas, 9 Ohio App.3d at 342, 460 N.E.2d at 313.
221 Plaintiff-Appellant Brief, at 17, 18, Soulas. In support of their assertion, counsel cited
12 0. JuR. 3d Business Relationships, § 528 (1979), which does indeed talk in terms of the
fiduciary nature of the duty of the majority or dominant group to deal fairly with the
corporation and its other shareholders. However, the concept of fiduciary duty so referred to
is the universally recognized standard of conduct applicable to all corporations, publicly
traded as well as close. It imposes a far less stringent obligation on the controlling
shareholders and should not be confused with the higher partnershiplike standard of
fiduciary responsibility applied to the controlling shareholders of a close corporation. See H.
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Given the solid base of support for the policy of protecting the rights of
oppressed minority shareholders, the question boils down to selection of
the proper approach to develop such protection. Should Ohio take
statutory action to provide a remedy for implementation by the courts or,
instead, should the task be left solely to the further development of relief
by judicial decision?
It might be argued, especially in view of the two recent Ohio appellate
decisions, that the more conservative position of allowing the remedy to
develop through judge-made law is warranted. Such a hands-off ap-
proach, however, would be shortsighted and faulty for several compelling
reasons.
First, the effect of the cases must be realistically viewed. Two Court of
Appeals decisions "do not make a summer."22 2 Their fact patterns present
garden variety types of shareholder oppression, while the ingenuity of
controlling shareholders over the years has spawned an amazing array of
different techniques to accomplish their improper objectives. 22 3 In order
to combat effectively modern-day shareholder oppression, what is needed
is the flexibility that only legislation can provide, by broadly defining the
wrongdoing condemned and by supplying an opposing arsenal of varied
and innovative types of relief.224 Shareholder oppression is too deep-
HENN. & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 11, at §§ 240 & 268. It appears that prior to the Schroer
decision there was no judicial recognition in Ohio of a partnershiplike fiduciary duty
applicable to close corporations. The Schroer opinion, however, equivocally states that "[in
Ohio, the [fiduciary relationship) principle has received somewhat less explicit, although a
nevertheless inferable, expression in the area of the authority of corporate directors or
majority shareholders to redeem or retire corporate stock" citing a 1910 Ohio Court of
Common Pleas decision and finding that "Itihe federal courts applying what they found to
be the Ohio law, assume the existence of a fiduciary duty between shareholders of a close
corporation .. " Schroer, 19 Ohio App. 3d 34 at 39, 482 N.E.2d at 980. The opinion relies
on 591 to support its conclusion that partnership principles are properly applicable to the
close corporation: "[B]y this enactment [of 591] Ohio has signalled its recognition of the
eclectic tendencies of the close corporation in blending features of the corporate and the
partnership form .... 19 Ohio App. 3d at 37, 482 N.E.2d at 979.
222 A fair evaluation of the two cases would indicate that Schroer is an important decision
and directly in the mainstream of contemporary developing protection for the rights of
minority shareholders of close corporations. Soulas, however, was narrowly decided and no
reliance was placed on principles of law peculiar to close corporations; it is therefore of far
less value as a precedent in the general area of shareholder oppression.
223 Professors O'Neal and Thompson devote most of four chapters, consisting of 562
pages, to "squeeze-out" techniques. See F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON supra note 19 (chapters
3-6). See also Wells, Involuntary Dissolution as a Remedy for Freeze-outs of Minority
Shareholders: Two West Virginia Statutes, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 47, 51 (1985).
224 Courts have generally been reluctant to grant nonstandard remedies in the absence
of authorizing legislation. O'Neal, supra note 25, at 874; MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT § 41
(Official Comment). See also Apicella v. Pat Corp., 17 Ohio App. 3d 245, 249, 479 N.E.2d 315
(1984)(court can order directors to set a fair rental fee, but cannot itself determine the
amount).
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seated225 and complex a problem to deal with by the slow and uneven
case-by-case development of law by Ohio courts. 226
In addition, enactment of an oppression relief law would result in a
balanced legislative treatment of the special needs of the shareholders of
Ohio close corporations. It would add to the preventive law planning
option made available by 591 a remedial response to the needs of
oppressed shareholders who have failed to bargain for protection. Improv-
ing the weak position of the minority and, conversely, curbing the nearly
absolute power of the majority, should encourage the parties' use of a
close corporation agreement, by giving the majority incentive to bargain
with the minority at the inception of the relationship. 227 The resulting
application of the carrot and stick principle should raise the level of close
corporation shareholder harmony. In cases where the opportunity to
bargain has not been utilized, a statutory oppression remedy would deter
oppressive conduct by the majority228 and would encourage out-of-court
settlement of shareholder disputes. 229
Finally, the surprising absence in Ohio, in this modern day and in
unfavorable contrast to most other states, of any statutory recognition of
the problem of shareholder oppression must be confronted. 230 This
untenable situation requires, in order to clear the air, that there be, by
the adoption of special legislation, an unequivocal expression of the
public policy of the state of Ohio favoring oppression relief.231 The
225 See F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at § 1:04.
226 See D. WETZEL, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS: CASES AND MATERIALS 3, 7 (1986).
227 See Peeples, supra note 191, at 504. At the present time, a knowledgeable minority
shareholder has great incentive to seek a close corporation agreement, and the majority
shareholder has little incentive. Unfortunately, however, it is the majority that is typically
in the position to implement 591, because of its influential role and closer relationship with
the attorney handling the organization of the venture.
22. See F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at § 10:09.
229 Counsel for the minority shareholder has advised that, following the denial of
certification by the Ohio Supreme Court, the Soulas case was settled by the majority
shareholders' purchase of all the minority's shares. This type of settlement, assuming that
the minority receives a price approaching fair value, would seem to be the best result in
many of these cases. See, e.g., Balvik v. Sylvester, 2 Corp. Counsel weekly (BNA) No. 35, P.1
(Aug. 20, 1987). Professors Hetherington and Dooley have urged that it is the only feasible
solution. See infra note 246 and accompanying text. A buy-out ordered by the court is a
prominent option in the list of various remedies contained in modern shareholder oppres-
sion statutes. See, e.g., MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT § 42; MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 450.1825 (1973);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 Subd. 2 (West 1985); N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:12-7 (West 1969 &
Supp. 1985); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW. § 1118 (McKinney 1986); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-21-150
(Law. Co-op. 1977). See also N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1118 (McKinney 1986)(conferring an
option on the remaining shareholders to buy out a shareholder who has petitioned for
involuntary dissolution pursuant to N.Y.B.C.L. § 1104-a on grounds of improper conduct on
the part of the controlling persons).
236 See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
23 See Olson, supra note 189, at 659.
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practical side of the coin, with which there can surely be no disagreement,
is the clear need to overhaul Ohio's outdated and ineffectual involuntary
dissolution statute.232 If that section of the OGCL is to be replaced, as it
certainly must,233 it would seem appropriate to adopt a new law that will
accord with present-day thinking on the subject of dealing with serious
ruptures of the close corporation shareholder relationship. 234
The balance of this section will consider the form that an Ohio
shareholder oppression statue might take. The statutes of other states
and the Model Act Supplement exhibit a variety of approaches to this
type of legislation. The Model Act Supplement includes the oppression
remedy as a separate section applicable to a corporation electing close
corporation status.235 By the same token, it thereby excludes from the
section's coverage all close corporations that have not made the elec-
tion.23 6 Other states have enacted self-executing provisions 237 affording
automatic protection to the shareholders of all corporations within the
category designated by the statute.
In defining the corporation whose controlling shareholders' conduct
will be subject to scrutiny, existing legislation runs the gamut.238 The
relief provided under some state laws is available only to corporations
having no more than a prescribed maximum number of shareholders.239
Relief is made available by New York to shareholders of all nonpublicly
232 O.R.C. § 1701.91. See Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits
as a Remedy for Close Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 25, 84 (1986) ([I]n states
like Ohio . . involuntary dissolution by minority shareholders is virtually impossible
because of overly restrictive statutes ... ).
233 The statute should, at the least, include "oppression" as a ground for involuntary
dissolution, as in the REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 14.30 (1984). (See infra note
243.) This might give a court a peg on which to hang its hat in fashioning some other type
of relief where, as is more often the case, the facts do not justify the severe remedy of
dissolution. See, e.g., Balvik v. Sylvester, 2 Corp. Counsel weekly (BNA) No. 35, P. 1 (Aug.
20, 1987); Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. Sup. Ct. App. 1980)(discussed in
Wells, supra note 223, at 66-67).
234 In addition to modem legislation in effect in other states, this recommendation is
strongly supported by the trend of the American common law of corporations. Olson, supra
note 189, at 634.
235 MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT § 40. See also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.995(19)(West 1986).
23 The election must be made by a statement contained in the articles of incorporation.
MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT § 3.
237 See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAWS § 450.1825 (1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 (West
1985); N.J. REv. STAT. § 14A:12-7 (West 1969 & Supp. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115
(1985); S. C. CODE ANN. § 33-21-150 (Law. Co-op. 1977).
235 Only self-executing laws are referred to in this paragraph.
239 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(b)(5)(West Supp. 1980) (35 shareholders); MINN, STAT.
ANN. § 302A.751, 302A.011 Subd. 6a (West 1985) (35 shareholders); N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 14A:12-7(1)(a) (West 1969 & Supp. 1985) (25 shareholders); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115
(1985) (35 shareholders).
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traded corporations, 240 and by the remaining states, theoretically, to all
corporations, whether close or publicly traded.
241
Most of the older statutes limit relief to the drastic, disfavored, and
generally unsatisfactory remedy of judicial dissolution,242 when it can
be established that "the directors or those in control of the corporation
have acted, are acting or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppres-
sive, or fraudulent. '243 The newer statutes,244 however, provide an
array of broad equitable relief, which may be invoked by the court
in its discretion as an alternative to dissolution. These laws have
also dramatically lowered the threshold of remediable wrongdoing to
include conduct that is "substantially prejudicial" to the petitioners.245
The ultimate relief for minority shareholders is that proposed by
Professors Hetherington and Dooley. They advocate legislation con-
ferring on the minority the unfettered right at any time of their choos-
240 The New York law empowers only holders of 20% or more of all outstanding shares
to petition for relief. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104-a (McKinney 1986). The laws of all other
states mentioned confer standing on any individual shareholder to seek relief.
241 In this category fall only a few statutes of the modem type found in the states listed
in supra notes 200 and 237. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1825 (1973); N.C. GEN STAT.
§§ 55-125(4), 55-125.1 (1982); S. C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-21-150(4), 33-21-155 (Law. Co-op. 1977).
The large remaining balance of these statutes are the older typical involuntary dissolution
laws modelled on MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 97 (1969). See infra note 243.
212 MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT § 40 at 1852 (Official Comment); O'Neal, supra note 25, at 882.
243 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 97 (1969), which has been carried over as REVISED MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 14.30(a)(1984). Section 97 has been adopted by a number of states as
their involuntary dissolution statute. See, e.g., N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:98(1977); OR.
REV. STAT. § 57.595 (1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-747 (1985). Consequently, the quoted
language defines the actionable wrong in the oppression relief provision of the corporation
law of most of the states that deal with the problem legislatively. Compared to modern
standards, it is a restrictive test that is generally met only by a showing of severe
misconduct by the controlling shareholders. See Olson, supra note 189, at 639.
244 See supra notes 200 and 237.
245 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 Subd. l(b)(2)(West 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 10-19.1-115-1(b)(2)(1985); WIS. STAT.ANN. § 33-21-150(a)(4)(West Supp. 1985); MODEL ACT
SUPPLEMENT § 40(a)(1). The Minnesota and North Dakota laws further provide that:
[I]n determining whether to order equitable relief, dissolution, or buy-out, the court shall
take into consideration the duty which all shareholders in a closely-held corporation owe
one another to act in an honest, fair, and reasonable manner in the operation of the
corporation and the reasonable expectations of the shareholders as they exist at the
inception and develop during the course of the shareholders' relationship with the
corporation and with each other.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302.(A).751, Subd. 3a (West 1985); N. D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115-3
(1985).
The "reasonable expectations" standard has been the linchpin of Professor O'Neal's
campaign for shareholder oppression statutory relief for the last 30 years. O'Neal, supra
note 25, at 885-88.
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ing to require the corporation to purchase their stock at its fair value.246
No state, however, has yet adopted this provocative concept.247
In drafting shareholder oppression legislation for Ohio, advantage
should be taken of the examples provided by the laws of other states and
the Model Act Supplement, 248 as well as the rich supply of the analyses
and proposals of legal scholars.249 Drawing upon these sources, the
author's recommendations as to the principal features of an Ohio statute
are briefly stated below.
Because the legislation is remedial, its advantages should be available
to all parties who are within the group intended to be protected, without
any technical barriers. Therefore, no prior election of close corporation
status, whether by means of a close corporation agreement or otherwise,
should be a prerequisite to eligibility for relief. Certainly, shareholders
who have not, through use of a close corporation agreement, engaged in
planning to avoid the events giving rise to future oppression have the
greatest need for the protection. 250 Thus, the law should be self-executing
246 Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 81. The proposal has been strongly criticized. See
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 24, at 288-90 (asserting a number of reasons why the
unconditional right to withdraw capital is undesirable); Kessler, supra note 39, at 690
(asserting the "enormous potential it offers for oppression by a minority").
" See Peeples, supra note 191, at 490. The Hetherington and Dooley proposal has the
considerable advantage of being the most simple solution to the problem, and it may not be
so radical as first appears when its partnership law antecedents are recognized. Under the
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT any partner has the power to cause dissolution even if such action
is in contravention of the partnership agreement. In such event, the dissatisfied partner is
liable for damages and the remaining partners may continue the business if they purchase
his interest. See A. BROMBEG & J. CRANE, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP § 75 at 428
(1968); UNIFORM PARTNERSIIIP ACT §§ 31(2), 38(2) (1910). Professors Hetherington and Dooley,
however, are proposing a more liberal remedy for the minority shareholder, since his would
be an absolute right to be bought out, subject only to the possibility of a renewable two-year
waiver. This denial of the corporation's unlimited right to opt out of the mandatory buy-out
would seem to be an unwarranted interference with the parties' freedom of contract and a
tilting of the scales too far in favor of the minority. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
24, at 298. The presence of an unrestricted opt-out privilege would strike a better balance
and would still provide meaningful protection for the minority by reversing the existing
presumption in favor of the majority. See Olson, supra note 198, at 630 n. 19. The result
would be that the majority would be required to initiate action to deprive the minority of its
statutory buy-out protection, which would promote advance planning in the form of an
agreement among the shareholders at the inception of the relationship. Thus, the effect
would be similar to (but, obviously, much stronger than) that resulting from the enactment
in Ohio of a shareholder oppression relief statute. See supra text accompanying note 227.
24 See supra notes 200 and 237.
249 See supra notes 189 and 202.
250 See Olson, supra note 189, at 633; O'Neal, supra note 25, at 881, 882. There are a
number of reasons why even those minority shareholders having an awareness of the
opportunity to contract for protection pursuant to 591 will justifiably fail to do so. See
Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 81, at 36, 37; Peeples, supra note 191, at 490.
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and, therefore, available to shareholders of all close corporations within
the statutory definition.
In making the crucial decision to define the class of corporations to be
covered, both extremes present in existing legislation251 should be
disapproved. The all-corporations approach should be rejected out of
hand because of its inclusion, albeit theoretical only, of publicly traded
corporations and the consequent fear, real or imagined, of inviting strike
suits. At the other extreme, the arbitrary number of shareholders test
would seem to be no more acceptable for this purpose than it was found
to be for 591.252 Therefore, aside from consistency, which in itself is an
important consideration in regard to legislation in pari materiae, the 591
eligibility test of no stock exchange listing or trading market for the
corporation's shares would seem to be the most fitting definition. 253
The improper conduct giving rise to relief should be effectively identi-
fied, using the language found in the newest statutes 25 4 and endorsed by
commentators. 25 5 Thus, the statute should cover action of directors or
those in control of the corporation that is illegal, oppressive, fraudulent,
or unfairly prejudicial to the complainant, whether in his capacity of
shareholder, director, officer or employee. 256
The relief that may, in its discretion, be crafted by the court upon a
showing of actionable oppression, should be the subject of an extensive
list.257 Included on the list should be such hands-on measures available to
the judge as ordering or setting aside any action on the part of the
corporation or its shareholders, directors or officers; removal or appoint-
ment of any individual as a director or officer; requiring payment of
dividends; and requiring the corporation or one or more of its sharehold-
ers to purchase the shares of the petitioner at their fair value and on
prescribed terms. Ordering dissolution of the corporation should be
authorized as a last resort. 258
To encourage the voluntary observance of high standards of conduct
251 See supra notes 239-41 and accompanying text.
252 See supra notes 87 and 88 and accompanying text.
253 See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 81, at 52, 53.
254 See supra notes 200 & 237 referring to the oppression relief provisions of various state
statutes and the MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT. All are deserving of careful consideration. The
newest and most comprehensive of the laws are Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.751 (West 1985)
and MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT § 40.
255 See Olson, supra note 189, at 632, 633; Mann, supra note 18, at 325.
... This language is substantially the same as that contained in Section 40 of the MODEL
ACT SUPPLEMENT, except that in the SUPPLEMENT's final draft the word "employee" was
dropped without explanation. The deletion, which has been criticized, would appear to have
significantly weakened the protection afforded a minority shareholder. See Kessler, supra
note 39, at 692, 693. The comparable provisions contained in the Minnesota, New Jersey,
and North Dakota laws all contain the reference to "employee."
211 See MODEL ACT SUPPLEMENT §§ 41, 42, 43.
258 Id.
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among shareholders and to discourage nuisance litigation, there should
be a provision permitting the court to award attorney's fees and other
expenses to any party. The basis for such an award should be a finding
that the losing party has been guilty of aggravated misconduct, either in
engaging in the acts complained of or in initiating the suit.259
VIII. CONCLUSION
Rarely would the shareholders of a close corporation in its organiza-
tional state not be greatly benefitted by thoughtful planning to tailor the
corporate form to their special needs. The good news is that in 591, Ohio
has for this purpose the most favorable law of all the states. It is easy to
use and highly effective. Unlike the situation prior to 591's adoption,
counsel need not be a corporate law expert nor be required to devote an
inordinate amount of time in order to produce a document that is totally
responsive to the clients' needs.2 60
The bad news is that, when engaged to form a close corporation, Ohio
attorneys may no longer safely be mere scriveners comfortably following
an old form. Inaction is, in effect, an election to be governed by the
corporate norms provided under the standard provisions of the OGCL and
the common law of corporations, inappropriate for the close corporation
as they may be. Attorneys, therefore, have an affirmative duty to call to
their clients' attention the options made available under 591 and to
suggest an agenda for their consideration.261 Hopefully, that initiative
... The exact language should be carefully drafted to assure that the provision acts as a
deterrent to misconduct on the part of any of the parties involved. MODEL ACT SuPPLEMENT
§ 41(b) is typical of the statutory provision that has been enacted for this purpose. It
provides that "[i]f the court finds that a party to the proceedings acted arbitrarily,
vexatiously, or otherwise not in good faith, it may award one or more other parties their
reasonable expenses, including counsel fees and the expenses of appraisers or other experts,
incurred in the proceeding." See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A. 751 Subd. 4 (West 1985); N.J.
REV. STAT. § 14A:12-7(10(West 1969 & Supp. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115(4)(1985).
Although this language appears to contemplate an award of expenses to either the
defendant or the plaintiff, the phrase used to describe the improper conduct does not seem
particularly apt to cover the oppressive action by the defendant that prompted initiation of
the suit. Moreover, the legislative comments and notes following the Minnesota and New
Jersey sections refer only to the relief given by the section to a defendant who has been
harassed by a "strike suit".
260 For comments concerning the ethical and malpractice implications of an attorney's
conduct in organizing a close corporation having more than one shareholder, see supra note
64.
261 See O'Neal, Preventive Law: Tailoring the Corporate Form of Business to Assure Fair
Treatment of All, 49 Miss. L.J. 529, 529-30 (1979). There is nothing remarkable about this
observation. Certainly, if the clients were to choose the partnership form of organization,
any responsible attorney would have no choice but to prepare a partnership agreement
confronting essentially the same issues. See supra note 119 and accompanying text
regarding the role of the 591(C) "laundry list" in advising clients.
[Vol. 35:165
42https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol35/iss1/9
THE CLOSE CORPORATION
will culminate in a close corporation agreement, which will provide the
foundation for the successful long-term relationship of the parties.262
In spite of the great advances accomplished by 591, it must be
recognized that permissive, preventive law measures are far from a
complete answer to the needs of close corporation shareholders. A
balanced response to those needs must also include self-executing flexible
statutory relief for oppressed shareholders. 263 Here, the OGCL, in sharp
contrast to most other states, is shockingly deficient. In fact, it is no
exaggeration to state that in this area the OGCL is more in need of repair
than were its close corporation planning provisions prior to the enact-
ment of 591.
Both commitment on the part of counsel to the use of the planning
opportunities now offered by 591 and creation of an effective statutory
remedy to neutralize shareholder oppression are needed to place Ohio in
the forefront of states providing enlightened treatment for the close
corporation and its shareholders.
262 Professor O'Neal has stressed the need for "resourcefulness and creativity" on the
part of the draftsman. O'Neal, supra note 261, at 558. For the Ohio attorney, 591 has largely
eliminated the need for resourcefulness by providing the close corporation agreement as the
perfect device for his or her task. Creative lawyering, however, is still at a premium when
it comes to structuring and drafting the substantive aspects of the shareholder relationship.
263 Commentators have for a number of years stressed the need for close corporation
legislation to provide both the opportunity for planning and self-executing protection
against unfair treatment of minority shareholders. See Bradley, A Comparative Assessment
of the California Close Corporation Provisions and a Proposal for Protecting Individual
Participants, 9 Loy. L. Rav. 865 (1975); Mann, supra note 18, at 338.
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APPENDIX A
O.R.C. § 1701.591
Close Corporation Agreement
(A) In order to qualify as a close corporation agreement under this
section, the agreement shall meet the following requirements:
(1) Every person who is a shareholder of the corporation at the time of
the agreement's adoption, whether or not entitled to vote, shall have
assented to the agreement in writing;
(2) The agreement shall be set forth in the articles, the regulations, or
another written instrument;
(3) The agreement shall include a statement that is to be governed by
this section.
(B) A close corporation agreement that is not set forth in the articles or
the regulations shall be entered in the record of minutes of the proceed-
ings of the shareholders of the corporation and shall be subject to the
provisions of division (C) of section 1701.92 of the Revised Code.
(C) Irrespective of any other provisions of this chapter, but subject to
division (D)(2) of this section, a close corporation agreement may contain
provisions, which shall be binding on the corporation and all of its
shareholders, regulating any aspect of the internal affairs of the corpo-
ration or the relations of the shareholders among themselves, including
the following:
(1) Regulation of the management of the business and affairs of the
corporation;
(2) The right of one or more shareholders to dissolve the corporation at
will or on the occurrence of a specified event or contingency;
(3) The obligation to vote the shares of a person as specified, or voting
requirements, including the requirement of the affirmative vote or
approval of all shareholders or of all directors, which voting requirements
need not appear in the articles unless the close corporation agreement is
set forth in the articles;
(4) The designation of the persons who shall be the officers or directors
of the corporation;
(5) The authority of any individual who holds more than one office of
the corporation to execute, acknowledge, or certify in more than one
capacity any instrument required to be executed, acknowledged, or
certified by the holders of two or more offices;
(6) The terms and conditions of employment of an officer or employee of
the corporation without regard to the period of his employment;
(7) The declaration and payment of dividends or distributions or the
division of profits;
(8) Elimination of the board of directors, restrictions upon the exercise
by directors of their authority, or delegation to one or more shareholders
or other persons of all or part of the authority of the directors;
(9) Conferring on any shareholder or his agent the absolute right,
[Vol. 35:165
44https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol35/iss1/9
THE CLOSE CORPORATION
without the necessity of stating any purpose, to examine and copy during
usual business hours any of the corporation's records or documents to
which reference is made in section 1701.37 of the Revised Code;
(10) Prohibition of or limitation upon the issuance or sale by the
corporation of any of its shares, including treasury shares, without the
affirmative vote or approval of the holders of all or a proportion of the
outstanding shares or unless other specified terms and conditions are
met;
(11) Arbitration of issues on which the shareholders are deadlocked in
voting power or on which the directors or other parties managing the
corporation are deadlocked.
(D) Except as may be necessary to give effect to divisions (C)(3), (5), (8),
and (9) and division (I) of this section, any provision of a close corporation
agreement that does either of the following shall be invalid:
(1) Eliminates the filing with the secretary of state of any document
required under this chapter or changes the required form or content of the
document;
(2) Waives or alters the effect of any of the provisions of section
1701.03, 1701.18, 1701.24, 1701.25, 1701.30, 1701.31, 1701.32, 1701.33,
1701.35, 1701.37, 1701.38, 1701.39, 1701.591 [1701.59.1], 1701.91,
1701.93, 1701.94, 1701.95, or the first sentence of section 1701.64 of the
Revised Code.
Unless otherwise provided in the close corporation agreement, the
invalidity of a provision pursuant to this division does not affect the
validity of the remainder of the agreement.
(E) Unless a close corporation agreement requires the affirmative vote
or written consent of the holders of a greater proportion of the shares of
any class, it may be amended or terminated by the affirmative vote or
written consent of the holders, then parties to the close corporation
agreement, of four-fifths of the outstanding shares of each class. If a close
corporation agreement is amended or terminated by the written consent
of the holders of fewer than all shares, the secretary of the corporation
shall mail a copy of the amendment or a notice of the termination to each
shareholder who did not so consent. If a close corporation agreement set
forth in the articles is amended, the amendment shall not be effective
unless it is filed as an amendment to the articles pursuant to section
1701.73 of the Revised Code.
(F) No close corporation agreement is invalid among the parties or in
respect of the corporation on any of the following grounds:
(1) The agreement is an attempt to treat the corporation as if it were a
partnership or to arrange the relationship of the parties in a manner that
would be appropriate only among partners;
(2) The agreement provides for the conduct of the affairs of a corpora-
tion or relations among shareholders in any manner that would be
inappropriate or unlawful under provisions of this chapter other than
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those set forth in division (D)(2) of this section or under other applicable
law;
(3) The agreement interferes with the authority or discretion of the
directors;
(4) The agreement has not been filed with the minutes as required by
division (B) of this section.
(G) If a close corporation agreement provides that there shall be no
board of directors, both of the following apply to the shareholders:
(1) They are, for the purposes of any statute or rule of law relating to
corporations, deemed to be the directors to the extent not inconsistent
with the close corporation agreement;
(2) They have all of the liabilities of directors.
(H) The existence of a close corporation agreement shall be noted
conspicuously on the face or the back of every certificate for shares of the
corporation and a purchaser or transferee of shares represented by a
certificate on which such a notation so appears shall be conclusively
considered to have taken delivery with notice of the close corporation
agreement. Any transferee of shares by gift, bequest, or inheritance and
any purchaser or transferee of shares with knowledge or notice of a close
corporation agreement is bound by the agreement and shall be considered
to be a party to the agreement.
(I) A close corporation agreement becomes invalid if shares of the
corporation are listed on a national securities exchange, are regularly
quoted in an over-the-counter market by one or more members of a
national or affiliated securities association, or are transferred or issued to
a person who takes delivery of the certificate for the shares other than by
gift, bequest, or inheritance and without knowledge or notice of the close
corporation agreement and that person does not consent in writing to the
close corporation agreement within thirty days after the date on which a
certificate for the shares has been issued in the name of that person or his
nominee.
In the event of such invalidity and unless otherwise provided in the
close corporation agreement, any provision contained in the agreement
that would not be invalid under any other section of this chapter or under
other applicable law remains valid and binding on the parties to the close
corporation agreement.
Any officer of the corporation who learns of the occurrence of any event
causing the invalidity of the close corporation agreement shall immedi-
ately give written notice of such invalidity to all of the shareholders.
If a close corporation agreement set forth in the article of the corpora-
tion becomes invalid, the officers of the corporation shall promptly sign
and file the certificate of amendment prescribed by section 1701.73 of the
Revised Code, setting forth the reason for invalidity and deleting the
close corporation agreement from the articles. If the officers fail to
execute and file the certificate within thirty days after the occurrence of
the event giving rise to the invalidity, the certificate may be signed and
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filed by any shareholder and shall set forth a statement that the person
signing the certificate is a shareholder and is filing the certificate
because of the failure of the officers to do so.
(J) A close corporation agreement, in the sound discretion of a court
exercising its equity powers, is enforceable by injunction, specific perfor-
mance, or other relief that the court may determine to be fair and
appropriate.
(K) The failure of a corporation, pursuant to a close corporation
agreement, to observe corporate formalities relating to meetings of
directors or shareholders in connection with the management of the
corporation's affairs shall not be considered a factor tending to establish
that the shareholders have personal liability for corporate obligations.
(L) This section shall not be construed as prohibiting any other lawful
agreement among two or more shareholders.
(M) No corporation with respect to which a close corporation agreement
is in effect, shall issue shares in uncertificated form, and any resolution
of the directors of such a corporation, providing for the issuance of shares
in uncertificated form, shall be ineffective during such period as a close
corporation agreement is in effect. The adoption of a close corporation
agreement shall act as a transfer instruction to such corporation to
replace uncertificated securities with appropriate certificated securities
in accordance with division (C) of section 1308.43 of the Revised Code.
(N) The amendments to this section that are effective April 1, 1985 are
remedial in nature and apply to all close corporations created on or after
November 17, 1981.
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APPENDIX B
FORM OF SINGLE SHAREHOLDER CLOSE
CORPORATION AGREEMENT
Articles of Incorporatione4
of
Gun, Inc.
(a corporation governed by a close corporation agreement pursuant to
§ 1701.591, R.C.)
The undersigned, desiring to form a corporation for profit under the
General Corporation Law of Ohio and to adopt a close corporation
agreement pursuant to § 1701.591 of the Revised Code, does hereby
certify and agree as follows:
Article One
Name
The name of said corporation shall be GUN, Inc.
Article Two
Principal Office
The place in the state of Ohio where its principal office is to be located
is the city of Cleveland, Cuyahoga County.
26 The person adopting the agreement is required by 591(A) to be a shareholder at the
time of adoption. However, under O.R.C. § 1701.09, it is not until after the articles have
been filed that subscriptions for shares can be received. Therefore, it is necessary that,
following the acceptance of the subscription and issuance of the shares, the sole shareholder,
in writing, confirm and adopt the close corporation agreement. This procedure will avoid the
necessity, following the issuance of shares, to file amended articles of incorporation
embodying the close corporation agreement. Corporations Counsel to the Office of the Ohio
Secretary of State has expressed his satisfaction with this procedure, and also with the
acceptability for filing of the form of articles of incorporation in Appendix B. He has also
recommended that all documents filed for the corporation with the Secretary of State
subsequent to the filing of the original articles refer in their preamble to the recording data
applicable to the original filing. Such a reference would eliminate the need for an
accompanying affidavit to justify the signing of the filed document by only one person. See
supra note 124.
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Article Three
Purpose
The purpose for which it is formed is to engage in any lawful act or
activity for which corporations may be formed under §§ 1701.01-1701.98
of the Revised Code.
Article Four
Number of Shares
The maximum number of shares which the corporation is authorized to
have outstanding is 750 shares, all of which shall be common shares
without par value.
Article Five
Close Corporation Agreement
The undersigned, Annie Gun, being the intended sole shareholder of
the corporation, does hereby adopt and assent to the following close
corporation agreement:
1. This agreement shall be governed by § 1701.591 of the Revised Code
of Ohio.
2. The corporation shall have no board of directors.
3. The corporation shall have no code of regulations.
4. Annie Gun shall be the president, secretary and treasurer of the
corporation, and there shall be no other officer of the corporation.
5. Annie Gun shall have the authority to execute, acknowledge, or
certify in all of her respective capacities as said three officers any
instrument required for any purpose to be executed, acknowledged, or
certified by the holders of two or more offices of the corporation.
6. The execution of any instrument by Annie Gun on behalf of the
corporation shall be the only act required to make such instrument
binding on the corporation and all persons dealing with the corporation
may rely thereon without further inquiry.
7. This agreement shall be effective upon the issuance of shares of the
corporation to Annie Gun.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto subscribed my name this
first day of October, 1986.
Annie Gun
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APPENDIX C
FORM OF MULTI-SHAREHOLDER CLOSE
CORPORATION AGREEMENT26S
Hypothetical underlying facts: Abel is 40 years old and contributing to
the venture his present manufacturing business, previously operated as
a sole proprietorship and having a present book value of $150,000; Baker
is 50 years old, is contributing $200,000 in cash, intended primarily as a
passive investment, although he will provide financial and managerial
guidance; Charley, 45 years old, is an experienced sales executive, who is
making a cash investment of $10,000 and, in addition, has resigned his
present position to serve as sales manager of the corporation. The parties
have selected the corporate form to achieve limited liability and per-
ceived tax benefits.
CLOSE CORPORATION AGREEMENT
(pursuant to § 1701.591, R.C.)
THIS AGREEMENT is entered into at Cleveland, Ohio on the 1st day
of October, 1986, by and among, ABC, Inc., an Ohio corporation, and
Abel, Baker and Charley, all of Cleveland, Ohio.
RECITALS
1. Abel, Baker and Charley (collectively the "Shareholders" and
sometimes individually "Shareholder") are all of the Shareholders of
ABC, Inc. (the "Corporation"), a newly formed Ohio corporation, which
they desire to be the subject of a close corporation agreement pursuant to
§ 1701.591, R.C.
2. The total number of issued and outstanding shares of capital stock of
the Corporation ("shares") is 100, of which Abel owns 45, Baker owns 45
and Charley owns 10.
... This form is intended to illustrate how the unique features of 591 can be imple-
mented. The reader is cautioned that some of the form's key provisions (e.g., employment
and compensation) are lacking in detail. Other forms of a multi-shareholder close corpora-
tion agreement under 591 appear in Z. & M. CAvrrCH, Omo CoRPoanroN LAW WITH FEDERAL
TAX ANALYSIS (1986) (Form No. 13a) and J. BLACKFORD, Ohio Corporation Law and Practice
(1985)(Form F 42.01).
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OPERATIVE PROVISIONS
1. Close Corporation Agreement. This Agreement is a close corporation
agreement governed by § 1701.591 of the Revised Code of Ohio.
2. No Code of Regulations. The Corporation shall have no code of
regulations.
3. No Board of Directors. The Corporation shall have no board of
directors.
4. Officers and Employment. The officers of the Corporation shall be:
Abel - President, Treasurer and Assistant Secretary; Baker - Executive
Vice President and Secretary; and Charley - Vice President, Sales. None
of the Shareholders shall take any action on behalf of the Corporation in
his capacity as an officer, which shall be inconsistent with the provisions
of this Agreement. Abel and Charley shall work full-time, and Baker
shall work part-time, for the Corporation.
5. Compensation. The annual salaries payable to the Shareholders by
the Corporation shall be: Abel - $80,000; Baker - $20,000; and Charley -
$70,000; and the same may be changed only by action taken pursuant to
Section 7 below. Charley shall receive, in addition to his annual salary,
a bonus equal to 2% of annual sales in excess of $5,000,000, provided that
such bonus in no event shall exceed an amount equal to one-half the
salary payable to Charley for the corresponding fiscal year.
6. Distributions. Following the end of each fiscal year of the Corpora-
tion, there shall be distributed to the shareholders, so long as the net
worth of the Corporation at year end shall be at least $400,000, an
amount equal to one-fourth of the Corporation's net profit for the previous
year, and, if said net worth shall at year end be at least $600,000, an
amount equal to one-half of such net profit. Such distribution shall be
payable 45% to Abel, 50% to Baker and 5% to Charley.266
7. Authorizing Action. Except as otherwise provided in this agreement,
all action on behalf of or with respect to the Corporation that would under
Ohio law ordinarily require action by a board of directors or shareholders
shall be taken only with approval of both Abel and Baker; except that the
unanimous approval of all the Shareholders shall be required for (a) the
issuance of any stock (including treasury shares) of the Corporation, (b)
the redemption of any Shareholder's shares, (c) an amendment to the
Article of Incorporation, (d) the dissolution of the Corporation, (e) a sale
of all or substantially all of the assets of the Corporation, (f) a merger or
consolidation of the Corporation, or (g) an increase, directly or indirectly,
in the compensation payable to any of the shareholders that shall not be
proportionate to the salaries established in section 5 above.
266 As a "division of profits" otherwise than in accordance with shareholdings, this
provision is clearly authorized under 591(C)(7). However, it would likely make the
corporation ineligible for Internal Revenue Code Subchapter S status. See supra note 111.
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8. Action in Writing and Notification. Action taken by the Shareholders
hereunder shall be evidenced by the written consent of those Sharehold-
ers whose approval is necessary, and where the concurrence of only Abel
and Baker is necessary, prompt notification in writing of such action
shall be given to Charley.
9. Transfers of Shares. No Shareholder shall, voluntarily or involun-
tarily, transfer his shares except in accordance with the following
provisions:
(Appropriate provisions should include, among other things,
restrictions on the transfer of shares; and purchase rights and
obligations in the event of death, permanent disability or termi-
nation of employment of any of the Shareholders, and possibly,
upon the happening of other events.)
10. Examination of Records. Any Shareholder or his agent shall have
the absolute right during usual business hours without the necessity of
stating any purposes, to examine and copy any of the Corporation's
records or documents.
11. Execution in Multiple Capacities. Each of Abel and Baker, who, as
above provided, hold two offices of the Corporation, is hereby authorized
to execute, acknowledge or certify in both of his capacities, any instru-
ment required for any purpose to be executed, acknowledged, or certified
by the holders of two or more offices of the Corporation.
12. Termination. Unless the Corporation is dissolved or this Agreement
is terminated earlier pursuant to the provisions hereof, this Agreement
shall continue in existence until September 30, 2000. At that time, unless
Abel and Baker otherwise agree, the Corporation shall be dissolved. If the
Corporation shall not be dissolved and Charley does not wish to continue
as a shareholder, he shall sell and the Corporation shall purchase his
shares for cash at a price equal to the fair value thereof, which, if the
Shareholders cannot agree, shall be determined by arbitration as pro-
vided in Section 13 below. Abel and Baker shall jointly and severally be
liable to purchase any of Charley's shares that the Corporation cannot
legally purchase, and, as between themselves, Abel and Baker shall each
acquire one-half of such shares or as they may otherwise agree.
13. Arbitration. In the event of a deadlock in voting power among the
Shareholders, the issue, at the option of either Abel or Baker, shall be
decided by binding arbitration in accordance with the rules of the
American Arbitration Association. Any other dispute arising under this
Agreement shall likewise be decided by arbitration initiated by any
Shareholder. If the arbitrator(s) shall find that any party to the proceed-
ing has acted arbitrarily, vexatiously or otherwise not in good faith,
either in initiating or pursuing the arbitration or in taking the position
or action resulting in the deadlock or dispute that is the subject of the
arbitration, the arbitrator(s) may assess against such party all or part of
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the reasonable expenses, including counsel and witness fees, incurred in
the proceeding by one or both other parties. Otherwise, such expenses
shall be paid by the corporation.
14. Legend and Notification. The following legend shall be conspicu-
ously noted on all stock certificates evidencing shares of the Corporation:
"The shares of stock represented by this certificate are subject to,
and are transferable (if at all) only in compliance with, a Close
Corporation Agreement, dated as of October 1, 1986, among the
Corporation and all of its shareholders, a copy of which has been
entered in the record of minutes of the proceedings of the
shareholders of the corporation. Any attempted transfer in vio-
lation of the provisions of said Agreement shall be null and void
and of no effect and, in any event, any transferee or purported
transferee of the shares evidenced hereby shall be bound by said
Agreement. The Corporation will mail to any shareholder a copy
of the Agreement without charge within five days of the receipt of
written request therefor."
With knowledge that the transfer of shares evidenced by a certificate that
does not carry a legend noting the existence of this Agreement could
result in the invalidation of the Agreement, each Shareholder agrees that
if he transfers shares represented by a certificate, which for any reason
does not bear such a legend, he will notify in writing such transferee of
the existence of this Agreement and deliver a copy thereof to him at the
time of such transfer. Any Shareholder's failure to do so will render him
liable to the Corporation and to the remaining Shareholders for compen-
satory and punitive damage.
15. Further Assurances. The parties shall execute and deliver such
other instruments and take such other action as may be necessary or
convenient to effectuate all the provisions of this Agreement.
16. Indemnification. Abel and Baker, jointly and severally, agree to
indemnify Charley against any liabilities of directors arising under
division (G)(2) of § 1701.159 R.C. as a result of action taken by Abel and
Baker in which, pursuant to Section 7 of this Agreement, Charley had no
right to and did not participate.
17. Equitable Relief. The parties acknowledge that it is impossible to
measure in money the damages that would result by reason of a party's
breach. It is therefore agreed that the provisions of this Agreement shall
be enforceable by injunction, specific performance or other equitable
relief, without reference to whether or not an adequate remedy at law
may be available. It is further agreed that any such equitable relief may
be awarded in the arbitration proceedings authorized hereunder.
18. Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and con-
strued in accordance with the laws of the State of Ohio.
19. Amendment or Termination. This Agreement may be amended or
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terminated only by the unanimous agreement of the Shareholders, which
must be evidenced by a writing signed by all of them.
20. Heirs and Successors. This Agreement shall inure to the benefit of
and be binding upon the respective heirs, personal representatives,
successors and assigns of the parties hereto.
21. Entire Agreement. This Agreement is the entire and exclusive
statement of the parties' agreement and it supersedes all prior agree-
ments, understandings, negotiations and discussions among the parties,
whether oral or written.
22. Section Headings. The section headings in this Agreement are
provided for convenience only and shall be disregarded in the interpre-
tation of the Agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto, intending to be legally
bound, have executed this Agreement as of the date at the beginning
thereof.
ABC, Inc.
by
President
Abel
Baker
Charley
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